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STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 106 
(TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION),
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6327
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Employer,
-and-
SUBWAY SURFACE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Transport Workers Union, Local 106 (Transit
Supervisors Organization) has been designated and selected by a majority of the
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.
Included: All Full-time Maintenance Supervisors, Level II working in
Maintenance of Way Division for the New York City Transit 
Authority.
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Excluded: Based upon their confidential duties, the following Maintenance
Supervisors, Level II, who work in the following Maintenance of 
Way units/positions and their successors: Paul K. Demarest, New 
Technology, Division of Signals; Russell C. Hope, Enterprise Asset 
Management, Division of Signals; Jean R. Jerome, Signal 
Operations, Division of Signals; Regy John, Signal Asset 
Management, Division of Signals; Joseph W. Kral, Signal 
Operations, Division of Signals; Kevin W. Lee, Signal Shop 
Material, Division of Signals; Anthony P. Maglione, Signal 
Operations, Division of Signals; Jose L. Aneiros, Maintenance 
Planner, Enterprise Asset Management and Maintenance Planning; 
Troy J. Rowe, Maintenance Planner, Enterprise Asset Management 
and Maintenance Planning; the successor to Mohamed Moustafa, 
Maintenance Planner, Enterprise Asset Management and 
Maintenance Planning; the successor to Regy John who previously 
held the position in Quality Assurance, Enterprise Asset 
Management and Maintenance Planning; and all other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Transport Workers Union, Local 106 (Transit Supervisors
Organization). The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6334
COUNTY OF LEWIS & SHERIFF,
Employer,
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, UNIT 725003,
OF LOCAL 10825,
Intervenor.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act;
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff/Correction, Special Patrol Officer,
Deputy Sheriff Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff/Sergeant/Juvenile Officer, 
Deputy Sheriff/Correction Officer/Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff Tech 
Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff/Correction Officer/Lieutenant, and Deputy 
Sheriff/Criminal Investigator.
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Jail Physician, Chief Deputy, and other
Sheriff’s Department Employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
LOCAL 687, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6349
FRANKLIN COUNTY AND FRANKLIN COUNTY 
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
Employer,
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Intervenor.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;1
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 1
1 This unit has been represented by the United Public Service Employees Union, which 
notified PERB, by letter dated October 27, 2015, that it supports the petition and 
disclaims any interest in further representing the unit.
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IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 687, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances.
Included: All full and part-time Sheriff Department employees.
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Warden, Principal Account Clerk/Typist, and
Correctional Facility Nurse.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with Local 687, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
UNION,
Petitioner,
- and -
CASE NO. CP-1397
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN and FRANKLIN 
COUNTY SHERIFF,
Employer.
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, P.C. (ERIC J. LARUFFA of 
counsel), for Petitioner
NORTH COUNTRY LABOR RELATIONS ASSOCIATES, INC. (DANIEL C. 
MCKILLIP of counsel), for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the employer, the County of 
Franklin and the Franklin County Sheriff (together, County), to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting an amended petition placing the title of 
correction officer lieutenant (lieutenant) into an existing bargaining unit of employees 
represented by the United Public Service Employees Union (UPSEU).1
EXCEPTIONS
The County filed exceptions to the decision based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to: 
(1) "base her decision upon the record”; (2) draw proper conclusions regarding the 
community of interest; (3) "adequately address respondent’s [sic] argument regarding 
the burden of proof”; and (4) permit the County to "[identify] duties of the lieutenant that 1
1 47 PERB H 4009 (2014).
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conflict with a community of interest of bargaining unit members.”2 For the reasons set 
forth herein, we find each of these exceptions meritless.
FACTS
On January 27, 2014, UPSEU filed a petition, as amended, seeking the 
placement of the newly-created position of lieutenant into an existing bargaining unit of 
County employees represented by UPSEU. The County responded, objecting to the 
placement on the ground that the lieutenant performed high-level supervisory duties that 
would make placing the lieutenant in the same unit as those he or she supervised 
inappropriate. A hearing was held on August 19, 2014, at which both parties were 
represented by counsel. Both parties filed post-hearing briefs. The facts are fully set 
forth in the ALJ’s decision and in the record before her, and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the County’s exceptions.
The Franklin County Sheriff, Kevin Mulverhill, was the only witness to testify at 
the hearing. According to Mulverhill, the bargaining unit at issue includes, among other 
employees, correction officers and sergeants, while managerial titles not in the unit are 
sheriff, undersheriff, warden and lieutenant.3 The lieutenant, sergeant and correction 
officer positions are all in the civil service competitive jurisdictional class.4
The lieutenant position was created in March 2013, in response to an analysis 
conducted by the New York State Commission of Correction (SCOC), which 
recommended the creation of an "assistant chief administrative officer” position to assist
2 Brief in Exception of the ALJ’s Decision, at p. 2.
3 Also included are the titles of Cook, Cook/Manager, Account Clerk, LPN, Account 
Clerk/Civil Deputy, Senior Account Clerk/Correction Officer and Senior Account 
Clerk/Civil Deputy. Neither party addressed these titles during the hearing. ALJ Ex 1.
4 Tr, at pp. 45-46.
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the chief administrative officer, the warden, and to pick up duties that had been 
performed by the undersheriff.5 Specifically, the lieutenant took over from the 
undersheriff the duty to update the policy and procedure manual to ensure compliance 
with the rules, regulations and minimum requirements set by the Commission of 
Correction.6 Currently, there is only one employee in the title.7
As Mulverhill explained:
When I first came into office, the policy and procedure [sic] 
hadn't been updated since probably 2000, so it was well over 
ten years. And the commission strongly urged us to update 
our policies. And with the current administrative staff, it was 
near impossible, along with the day-to-day operations and 
just the curve balls that get thrown at you on a daily basis, it 
was almost impossible to get to the updating of the policy.
So during their staffing analysis, it became clear to the 
Commission of Corrections the position was needed that 
could be specific to updating the policy and procedure.8
Mulverhill testified that in addition to updating procedures, the day-to-day duties 
of the lieutenant would include directly supervising the sergeants and ensuring 
compliance with the rules and regulations of the sheriff and the minimum standards set 
by SCOC.9 The lieutenant could not and does not conduct formal evaluations of those 
he supervises because there is no formal evaluation process.10 1The lieutenant has no 
role in hiring other than making recommendations to the sheriff based on his review of 
employment applications.11 The sheriff does hiring and firing (although as of the 
hearing, no individual had been terminated) and determines whether a probationary
5 Employer Ex 1; Tr, at p. 26.
6 Tr, at p. 29.
7 Tr, at p. 18.
8 Tr, at p. 44.
9Tr, at pp. 31-32.
10Tr, at p. 41.
11 Joint Ex 1.
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employee becomes a permanent employee.12 The lieutenant may be assigned to help 
investigate potential disciplinary charges against other employees but has no other role 
in the disciplinary process.13 Moreover the sheriff may call upon the lieutenant to help 
in an internal investigation and obtain documents as he would a sergeant.14 The 
lieutenant would oversee the sergeants (and could direct them to gather evidence in a 
disciplinary matter)15 and has more overall responsibility for the operation of the jail than 
a sergeant.16 The lieutenant works the 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. shift, which is one of the 
three shifts worked by correction officers.17 It is the warden who approves time off.18
Thus, the Sheriff sets overall policy which includes all relevant rules and 
regulations and makes employment-related decisions.19
DISCUSSION
Under §§ 201.2 (b) and 201.5 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), the filing of a 
unit placement petition commences a representation proceeding limited to determining 
whether an at-issue position should be accreted to a pre-existing unit. In determining a 
unit placement petition, we conduct a nonadversarial investigation and apply the 
statutory criteria set forth in § 207.1 of the Act.20 It is, "in substance and effect, a mini 
representation proceeding calling only for [such] a nonadversarial investigation and the 
application of the statutory uniting criteria in § 207.1 of the Public Employees' Fair
12 Tr, at pp. 47-48.
13 Tr, at pp. 35, 45.
14 Tr, at pp. 45, 51-52, 54.
15 Tr, at p. 50.
16 Tr, at p. 49.
17 Tr, at p. 46.
18 Tr, at p. 52.
19 Tr, at p. 43.
20 AFSCME, Local 264 (City of Buffalo), 46 PERB fl 3023 (2013); General Brown Cent 
Sch Dist, 28 PERB fl 3065 (1995).
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Employment Act (Act).”21
Thus, we will first address the County’s exception that the ALJ, by asking the 
County to present its evidence first at the hearing, placed an undue burden of proof 
upon the County. This claim is manifestly without any merit. Logic dictates that one 
party must proceed first during a hearing and that another party must, therefore, go 
second; proceeding first does not place any burden of proof on a party. The County 
was aware that the hearing would be conducted in such a manner before walking into 
the hearing.22 An ALJ has considerable discretion with respect to conducting hearing 
under § 212.4 of the Rules, including discretion to control the order of proof to promote 
an orderly and expeditious hearing and she did not abuse that discretion by requiring 
one particular party to go first.23
Moreover, as explained to the County during the hearing, the petition was one for 
unit "placement” the ALJ correctly described as investigatory rather than adversarial in 
nature.24 We have held:
A unit clarification petition seeks only a factual determination 
as to whether a job title is actually encompassed within the 
scope of the petitioner's unit. We have held a unit 
clarification petitioner to a burden of proof on its petition 
because that particular type of petition necessarily seeks 
only a determination of fact. A unit clarification petition 
differs from a unit placement petition. Although both are 
directed to newly created or substantially altered titles, only
21 General Brown Cent Sch Dist, 28 PERB fl 3065, (1995).
22 Tr, at p. 10.
23 County of Orleans, 25 PERB fl 3010, n. 2 at 3029 (1992). See also City of Elmira 
(PBA), 41 PERB fl 3018, 3084 (2008), citing Nanuet Union Free Sch Dist, 17 PERB fl 
3005 (1984); Bd of Ed of the City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo and Buffalo Teachers 
Fed, 26 PERB fl 3019 (1993); New York State Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees, Council 82, AFSCME (Fronczak), 29 PERB fl 3015 (1996); Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 580, AFL-CIO (Farella), 32 PERB fl 3053 (1999).
24 Id.
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the unit placement petition puts the appropriateness of the 
unit under § 207 of the Act in issue. Moreover, the unit 
placement petition proceeds from the finding or admission 
that the position in issue is not in the petitioner's unit, but 
should be most appropriately placed there.25
The County also takes exception to the ALJ’s evidentiary rulings at various times
limiting the testimony of the only witness, the sheriff.26 We have examined the rulings to
which the County takes exception and each denies the sheriff the opportunity to offer
his legal conclusion and speculate rather testify as to a fact. Rather than set forth the
text of each of the questions the ALJ ruled was improper, we will cite the following two
as representative:
County: Now, in terms of the overall management and, in particular, the 
responsibilities of the lieutenant, do you see any potential conflicts if the 
lieutenant is placed in the unit with the bargaining unit employees?27
County: In terms of the knowledge that the sheriff would have, such as if he 
[lieutenant] became a union shop steward or the chief negotiator for the union of 
the president of the union, would that pose a problem for him carrying out his 
responsibilities?
ALJ: I’m going to stop you. That ultimately is my decision to make. What you 
need to tell me is what this lieutenant does. . . What’s relevant is what the 
individual does.
County: Right. Oh, okay. I see the distinction, not what could happen.28 
It is incumbent upon the ALJ to draw and, as in this case, ultimately the Board to 
reach the legal conclusions called for by the Amended Petition, not a witness. The ALJ
25 CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME, 24 PERB fl 3019, 3038 (1991) citing CSEA, Local 
1000, AFSCME, 21 PERB fl 3030, affg 21 PERB fl 4012 (1988).
26 In particular, the County cites to Tr, at pp. 32 (lines 20-24); 33 (lines 1-11); 37 (lines 
16-24); 38 (lines 17-24); 39 (lines 1-2).
27 Tr, at p. 32 (lines 20-24).
28 Tr, at pp. 37 (lines 16-24), 39 (lines 3-4).
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did not improperly exercise her discretion by barring such speculative testimony.
The substance of the County’s exceptions is that the ALJ failed to base her 
decision on the record and erroneously found a community of interest. The record and 
her determination belie those exceptions. As a first point, the County alleges that titles 
other than that of lieutenant, sergeant and officers were ignored. Those titles are 
indeed, a part of the record, and indeed, were included in the Amended Petition.29
Every member of a unit need not perform identical tasks. However, the County 
raises in its exceptions for the first time this issue. At the hearing, it only raised 
concerns regarding the new title’s prospective relationship with respect to correction 
officers and sergeants. The County made it clear that it would "argue that it’s 
inappropriate to be in the unit with people that he’s [lieutenant is] supervising and 
responsible for evaluating. We acknowledge that were there a supervisory unit, we 
would not be here today in this proceeding and we would not object to a lieutenant 
being placed in such a unit. . .”30 But using the County’s argument, cooks should not 
be in the same unit as correction officers and accountants -  which they are. The 
sanctity of the UPSEU unit, as a whole, was never challenged or put into question 
below.31
Indeed, the mission of the sheriff is, in his words, "that of administering the
29 ALJ Ex 1.
30 Tr, at p. 12.
31 It should be noted that the Board has held that a unit of uniformed and non-uniformed 
personal is not per se inappropriate. See County of Schenectady and Sheriff of 
Schenectady County, 14 PERB ^ 3013 (1981) (where we included within a sheriff’s 
office, the titles of correction officer and correction lieutenant along with physician’s 
assistant, cook and senior typist).
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county jail and whatever other duties the voters see fit. . .”32 The Sheriff’s office has no 
general law enforcement component. Thus, while the direct care of inmates may not be 
every member of the bargaining unit’s day-to-day focus, they all work together to fulfill 
one governmental mission. The ALJ, when comparing the lieutenant to sergeants and 
correction officers, correctly noted their mission.
Getting to the nub of the County’s case and exceptions, there is no formal 
evaluation system in place, and the lieutenant does not supervise and administer 
employee performance and evaluation interviews and reports.33 The tasks that might 
involve implementing such a system were established at the hearing as being strictly 
theoretical and purely speculative. The lieutenants, like other officers, are members of 
the competitive civil service class. While it is not clear from the record whether 
lieutenants and the remaining members of the unit are all paid on the same basis (per 
annum or hourly), the answer to that question is not dispositive in this matter given the 
other facts that were adduced.34
The Board’s decision in St. Paul Boulevard Professional Firefighters Assn, is
particularly instructive where it upheld an ALJ’s placement of newly created fire
lieutenant position in a pre-existing bargaining unit containing other paid firefighters:
In sharp contrast to the provisions of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), [citation omitted] the Act does not 
exclude supervisors from the statutory rights to organization 
and representation, nor does the Act define what constitutes
32 Tr, at p. 16.
33 Tr, at p. 40.
34 St. Paul Boulevard Professional Firefighters Assn, 42 PERB 3009, at 3028 (2009) 
("The existence of disparities in benefits is not a sufficient basis for the exclusion of an 
unrepresented employee when other facts, such as shared duties and responsibilities, 
establish a community of interest.”) (citing Unatego Cent Sch Dist, 15 PeRb 3097 
(1982) and County of Genesee, 29 PERB 3068 (1996)).
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a supervisor. [citation omitted]. Under the Act, in determining 
whether an unrepresented supervisor should be placed in a 
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees, the Board will 
apply the community of interest and administrative 
convenience standards set forth in § 207.1 of the Act, with 
the community of interest given predominant consideration.35
The most important criterion under § 207.1 of the Act for determining a unit 
placement petition is, indeed, the community of interest standard.36 Under this 
standard, the Board has consistently held that, "[a]mong the factors to be considered in 
determining whether a community of interest exists are similarities in terms and 
conditions of employment, shared duties and responsibilities, qualifications, common 
work location, common supervision, and an actual or potential conflict of interest 
between the members of the proposed unit.”37
When examining the issue of placing an unrepresented supervisor into a pre­
existing unit, we also examine:
Whether the extent and nature of the assigned supervisory 
functions create a conflict of interests, thereby outweighing 
other facts that may support inclusion. [citation omitted]
Among the significant supervisory duties that may indicate 
such a conflict of interests is the authority to impose 
discipline, initiate disciplinary procedures, conduct formal 
evaluations, render first step decisions on contract 
grievances and provide supervision over day-to-day 
operations.38
35 42 PERB fl 3009, 3027 (2009). That case is particularly instructive where in the 
Board upheld an ALJ’s placement of newly created fire lieutenant position in a pre­
existing bargaining unit containing other paid firefighters.
36 AFSCME, Local 264 (City of Buffalo), 46 PERB fl 3023 (2013); Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Auth, 45 PERB fl 3020 (2012).
37 Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth, 45 PERB fl 3020, at 3050 (2012); citing 
Sachem Cent Sch Dist, 42 PERB fl3030 (2009); St. Paul Boulevard Professional 
Firefighters Assn, 42 PERB fl 3009 (2009); Monroe #1 BOCES, 39 PERB fl 3024 
(2006); Somers Cent Sch Dist, 12 PERB fl 3068 (1979); East Ramapo Cent Sch Dist, 
11 PERB fl 3075 (1978); Somers Cent Sch Dist, 12 PERB fl 3068 (1979).
38 St. Paul Boulevard Professional Firefighters Assn, 42 PeRb fl 3009, at 3028.
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In this matter, the lieutenant shares the same work location as other members of
the unit, has terms and conditions of employment set by the County, may participate in
the investigation of disciplinary matters but has no authority to impose discipline, or to
hire or fire fellow unit members or even conduct evaluations of those members and is
answerable in many matters to the sheriff, without having independent authority.39
Thus, based upon their common conditions of employment, supervision and work
responsibilities, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that there is a community of interest
between the title of lieutenant and the other titles in the current bargaining unit.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ’s findings granting the petition of
the UPSEU are affirmed.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
39 Id.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
ALBANY POLICE OFFICERS UNION, LOCAL 
2841, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS UNION, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
- and -
Charging Party,
CASE NO. U-29881
CITY OF ALBANY,
Respondent.
SCHEUERMANN & SCHEUERMANN, LLP (ARTHUR SCHEUERMAN Special 
Counsel), and KEVIN S. CASEY, LLP (KEVIN S. CASEY Special Counsel) for 
the Albany Policy Officers Union, Local 2841, Law Enforcement Officers 
Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CiO.
ROEMER WALLENS GOLD & MINEAUX, LLP (MARY M. ROACH of counsel), 
for the City of Albany.
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Albany Police Officers Union, 
Local 2841, Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(APOU) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City of 
Albany (City) did not violate § 209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally changed the health insurance coverage and Medicare Part B 
reimbursement for members of the patrol, communications and civilian units when such 
members retire.1 
1 47 PERB 4593 (2014).
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EXCEPTIONS
APOU filed four exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. First, it takes exception to the 
ALJ’s finding that mandatory benefits for current employees, even if paid in retirement, 
are negotiable, correctly finding "that the elements of an enforceable past practice are 
satisfied,” but then allowing a unilateral cessation of those benefits to current 
employees, thus reducing their compensation package without negotiations, on the 
ground that "the City never directly notified current employees of its intention to reduce 
the value of their compensation package.”2 Second, APOU takes exception to the 
ALJ’s ruling that a party alleging an unlawful unilateral change of a mandatorily 
bargainable issue must first demand to negotiate over that change; it did not make such 
a formal demand in this matter. Third, it avers that allowing a "silent unilateral 
modification of compensation package of current employees” to nonetheless impose a 
requirement of a formal demand for bargaining be made violates the Act’s public policy. 
Finally, APOU takes exception to the conclusion reached by the ALJ that the City did 
not violate the Act.
The City filed papers supporting the ALJ’s decision. Upon review of the papers 
filed herein and the proceedings below, we affirm the ALJ’s decision, albeit for different 
reasons than those stated in her opinion.
FACTS
A hearing was held on November 15, 2011 and February 8, 2012, at which both
2 Exceptions, at ^ 1.
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parties were represented by counsel.3
APOU represents three separate bargaining units (patrol, communications and 
civilians) in the City's police department, each with its own collectively negotiated 
agreement. The agreements' durations are January 1,2002 through December 31, 
2005 and all were extended by MOAs through 2009. Each agreement covers health 
insurance for current employees but is silent on the issue of health insurance benefits 
for retirees and silent on reimbursement of Medicare Part B costs incurred by 
employees and retirees.4 The core of APOU’s charge is that the City discontinued a 
past practice of providing a future benefit to current employees upon their retirement of 
reimbursing such individuals for the cost of Medicare Part B payments and continuing 
coverage upon retirement by the City’s primary insurance plans received while 
employed (formerly, Blue Cross/Blue Shield Indemnity Extended Benefits or 
Wraparound plans).5
Charles Barthe, a member of the communications unit's negotiating committee
3 Following an initial pre-hearing conference, the matter was conditionally dismissed in 
light of the parties’ contractual grievance procedure (raised an affirmative defense by 
the City) and deferred to arbitration. Thereafter, the charge was reopened by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation, in a decision dated March 
1,2011, because the arbitrator found that he lacked jurisdiction and, therefore, did not 
reach the merits of the dispute.
4 Joint Ex 8 (article 19.1 for patrol unit), 9 and 10 (article 19 communications unit which 
specifically provides in relevant part that "[i]f the EMPLOYER wishes to change the 
existing health insurance plan the EMPLOYER shall present proposals to the UNION for 
discussion and possible agreement on the proposal . . . [and if] no proposal is agreed 
upon, then an expedited arbitration will commence . . .”), and 11 and 12 ( article 24 for 
civilians unit).
5 APOU’s Improper Practice Charge and post-hearing "Memorandum of Law”, at p. 1.
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for the last two agreements that expired in 2009 and 2005, testified that there were no 
contract proposals regarding either Medicare Part B reimbursement or the continuation 
of the extended healthcare benefits into retirement when those agreements were 
implemented.6 In addition, James Teller, a patrol unit member who served as a union 
officer during his employment, including president, testified that APOU unsuccessfully 
attempted to add language codifying the members’ retirement healthcare benefits into 
the contract during negotiations.7 Christian Mesley, APOU’s president until March,
2011 (and a member of the patrol unit), testified that the City had never negotiated with 
APOU concerning either the change to Medicare reimbursement or the health insurance 
plans.8
Before the events at issue here, the City had unilaterally implemented changes in 
health benefits provided to retirees. On or about October 31,2008, the City sent a 
document titled "IMPORTANT NOTICE” (2008 Notice) addressed to "Retirees and 
Participants Who Have City of Albany Health Insurance,” which stated that "as of 
January 1,2009, the City is no longer offering the following health plans: GHI, Inc. [and] 
MVP Health Plan,” and required enrollees in those plans to select from the City’s other 
options.9 As summarized by City Personnel Director Elizabeth Lyons, the 2008 Notice 
further implemented changes to prescription drug co-payments, and added "step
6 Tr, at p. 36.
7 Tr, at pp. 50-51.
8 Tr, at p. 69.
9 Joint Ex 3.
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therapy, prior authorization, quantity limits, contingent therapy” to the "prescription 
portion” of the retiree benefits.10 1The 2008 Notice further provided that: "Under the City’s 
current policy, the City will reimburse you the Medicare Part B premium on a monthly 
basis.”11 Lyons also testified to other changes involving prescription and office copays 
to available plans and "other minor changes to the plans over these years [2000 to 
2010] as well.”12
Lyons explained that the City sent three separate letters to all retirees regarding 
changes to their health insurance coverage in 2008. The first letter, dated September 
30, 2008, stated the following, in relevant part:
To All Retirees:
This letter is to notify you that beginning January 1,2009, there will be 
changes to your current health insurance coverage and/or prescription coverage 
with the City of Albany. The City has been working closely with our health 
insurance and prescription providers to re-structure current plans to offer you 
similar coverage.
For those of you that are not Medicare Part B eligible, the proposed 
changes will affect only the prescription portion of your policy. The prescription 
co-pay will be changed from a fixed $2.00 co-pay to $2.00 for Generic and $7.00 
for Brand name.
For retirees that are Medicare eligible, the City will be offering two new 
Medicare Advantage plans that are similar to your current type of coverage. If 
you are currently covered by CDPHP, and are Medicare eligible, the new CDPHP
10 Tr, at p. 191; Joint Ex 3 at 1-2. Respondent’s Ex 2 contains 3 notices dated 
September 30, October 22 and October 29 addressed to retirees.
11 Joint Ex 3, at 2. Testimony was also taken with respect other notices sent during the 
"open enrollment” period in 2008 to employees (Joint Ex 4) which have no bearing on 
this decision.
12 Tr, at p. 184.
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PPO Medicare Advantage Plan will be available to you.
For retirees currently enrolled in the Empire BlueCross Extended Benefits, 
Empire BlueCross Wrap-Around Plan, Empire BlueCross HMO, or BlueShield 
HMO/POS, the City will be offering a BlueShield of Northeastern New York PPO 
Medicare Advantage Plan. The plan is very similar to BlueCross in so far as 
there are no co-pays, no coinsurances and no deductibles. The prescription co­
pay will be increased from a fixed $2.00 to $2.00 for Generic and $7.00 for Brand 
name. The primary difference in the policy is that a doctor must accept Medicare 
in order for the doctor to be covered. The BlueShield of Northeastern New York 
PPO MAP policy will provide benefits for vision, dental and hearing, which are 
currently not covered under the Empire BlueCross Plans.13
The second letter to retirees, dated October 22, 2008, stated in pertinent
part:
Dear City of Albany Retiree:
Attached is information regarding the new Medicare Advantage Plans that 
will be replacing your current health insurance effective January 1,2009. It is 
mandatory that as a Medicare eligible retiree you choose one of the two plans:
BlueShield Medicare PPO: The plan design is similar to Empire 
BlueCross extended plan, as it has a $0 co-pay for participating providers, no 
deductibles and no coinsurance. The prescription coverage will be $2/$7 ($2 for 
Generic, $7 for Brand). Please review the enclosed plan summary for specific 
services. This plan also affords benefits for vision, dental and hearing aids.
CDPHP Medicare Choices: This plan design offers a $5 co-payment for 
Primary Care Physician visits and a $10 co-payment for specialty visits. 
Preventive services have a $0 co-payment. Please review the plan summary for 
specific services and the applicable co-pays, as well as the prescription co­
payments. This plan also affords benefits for vision, dental and hearing aids.
You will be receiving another letter shortly listing dates and times of 
informational meetings in November. These meetings are designed to help our
13 Respondent’s Ex 2.
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Medicare-eligible retirees, employees, and dependents learn about the change in 
the health insurance plans.14
The third letter to retirees, dated October 29, 2008, in relevant part:
Dear Medicare Eligible Retiree:
Enclosed are applications for BlueShield Medicare PPO and CDPHP 
Medicare Choices. Please choose one and fill out the appropriate application....
If you currently have a family plan with a spouse or eligible dependents 
(who are not Medicare eligible), they will remain on their current insurance.
If you wish to gather additional information before selecting an insurance 
plan, we have scheduled informational seminars regarding the Medicare 
Advantage plans being offered. Below are dates and locations of these 
meetings.15
Lyons explained that the Medicare Advantage Plan took away benefits such as 
pediatric care and pediatric vitamins, and anything that would be relevant to a family as 
it grows and matures, and "added things that would be more advantageous for 
someone who may be 65 or older,” such as hearing, vision and dental.16 According to 
Lyons, hearing, vision and dental benefits were not provided to active employees under 
the City’s Wrap-Around or Extended Benefits plans.
Mesley acknowledged that, pursuant to the 2008 Notice and associated 
documents, retirees were "switched into a PPO,” but testified that APOU did not file any 
charge or grievance because "because there was no diminishment other than the two to
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Tr, at pp. 197-198.
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seven dollar co-pay.”17
Lyons testified that the notice regarding Medicare Part B sent in 2008 was not
sent to active employees because "[t]here's a different notice that goes to active
employees,” and that the term "participants” referred to in the notice are only "those
individuals that are COBRA and surviving spouses” not existing employees.
The genesis of the matter before us is a notice the City sent on or around
October 30, 2009, to all "Retirees and Participants Who Have City of Albany Health
Insurance (non-active employees),” regarding the "Open Enrollment Period for Health
Insurance.” The notice stated the following, in relevant part:
Open Enrollment is the entire month of November. During this time, you may 
choose to change your current health insurance coverage to one of the other 
plans offered by the City. If you decide to change to a different plan, the new 
coverage will become effective January 1,2010.
Please be aware of the following changes:
As of January 1,2010, the City is no longer offering the following health 
insurance plans:
BlueShield Community Blue HMO 
Empire Blue HMO
Empire BlueCross Extended Benefits 
Empire BlueCross Wrap-Around
If you are enrolled in any of these plans, you must either select the Capital 
District Physicians' Health Plan or Empire BlueCross PPO.
New Benefits:
Effective January 1,2010, the City will be offering a new Empire BlueCross plan. 
Empire BlueCross PPO has a $10 co-pay for office visits and $2/$7/$20 co-pay 
for prescription coverage ($2 generic, $7 brand, $20 formulary drugs.)
17 Tr, at p. 76.
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Changes for existing plans:
Capital District Physicians' Health Plan's co-pay will increase from $10 to $15 in 
January 2010. (This is for the commercial plan, not the Medicare Advantage 
Plan.)
BlueShield PPO Medicare Advantage Plan's prescription co-pay for a 90-day 
supply at a retail pharmacy will increase from 2 co-pays to 3 co-pays. (The mail 
order will still remain at 2 co-pays for a 90-day supply.)
Medicare Eligibility
Medicare Advantage Plans were implemented as of January 1,2009. Any retiree 
who is Medicare eligible (Parts A & B) must switch to a Medicare Advantage 
Plan. There are two options available: BlueShield PPO Medicare Advantage Plan 
and CDPHP Medicare Advantage Plan. It is mandatory that you elect Medicare 
Part B coverage when you become Medicare eligible. (You will receive Part A 
automatically when eligible.) Failure to enroll in Medicare Part B will result in the 
cancellation of your insurance through the City. Please note, if you do not enroll 
in Medicare Part B once you are eligible, you will also be penalized by Medicare 
and pay a higher monthly premium. Please remember to contact Medicare or the 
Social Security Administration 3 months prior to you and/or your spouse 
becoming Medicare eligible (age 65 or disabled). Once you receive your 
Medicare card, a copy must be sent to this office and you must then enroll in a 
Medicare Advantage Plan, as stated above. An important reminder: DO NOT 
enroll in Medicare Part D. Your prescription coverage will remain with the health 
insurance that you choose (BlueShield or CDPHP).
Medicare Eligibility on or after February 1,2010
Retirees who receive Medicare Part B eligibility as of February 1,2010 or later 
and elect the BlueShield PPO Medicare Advantage Plan, please note, your 
prescription coverage will be $2/$7/$20.
Medicare Refund for Part B Coverage
As of December 31, 2009, the City will no longer reimburse individuals for 
the Medicare Part B premium whose effective date for Part B is January 1, 
2010 and later. Individuals currently receiving a Medicare refund will continue to 
do so. Please note, regardless of your eligibility for Part B premium refund, it is 
mandatory that you elect Medicare Part B coverage when you become Medicare 
eligible.18
18 Joint Ex 1 [emphasis added].
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On or around October 30, 2009, the City also sent a notice to “All Eligible Active
Employees Covered by City Insurance,” regarding the “Open Enrollment Period
(November) for All Benefits.” The notice stated the following, in relevant part:
Open enrollment is the month of November. During this time, you may 
choose to change your current health insurance coverage to one of the other 
plans offered by the City. If you decide to change to a different plan, the new 
coverage will become effective January 1,2010. Eligible employees are also 
allowed to review and enroll in Dental and Vision coverage during open 
enrollment. We are currently working with our insurance carriers to finalize 2010 
benefits and rates. More information will be available during open enrollment.
Please be aware of the following changes:
As of January 1,2010, the City is no longer offering the following health 
insurance plans:
BlueShield Community Blue HMO 
Empire Blue HMO
If you are enrolled in any of these plans, you must review other health 
insurance options and opt into one of the other health insurances that the City 
offers.
The following plan(s) will only be offered to Unionized Employees:
Empire BlueCross (Extended and Wrap)
Non-union employees will have the option to participate with either the Capital 
District Physicians' Health Plan or Empire BlueCross PPO.
New Benefits:
Starting January 1,2010, the City will be offering a new Empire BlueCross plan. 
Empire BlueCross PPO has a $10 co-pay for office visits and $2/$7/$20 co-pay 
for prescription coverage ($2 generic, $7 brand, $20 formulary drugs)
Changes for existing plan:
Capital District Physician's Health Plan’s office co-pay will increase from $10 to 
$15 in January 2010. (This is for the commercial plan, not the Medicare 
Advantage Plan.)
For non-union employees, police civilian union employees, Teamsters and
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Operating Engineers who have Informed Rx (formerly NMHCRx) for prescription 
coverage, please note we are changing to a new prescription vendor. Effective 
January 1,2010, our new prescription carrier will be EnvisionRxOptions and their 
mail order company, Orchard.
Hospitalization buyout incentive (eligible employees):
The buyout incentive for employees is $1,500 for individual coverage and $3,000 
for family coverage. Union employees should refer to their union contract for their 
buyout incentive. Please contact the Office of Personnel for additional 
information.
Flexible Benefits Plan:
Enrollment forms for 2010 are available through your payroll personnel, from 
this office or at the open enrollment locations.
NYS Deferred Compensation:
All employees have the opportunity to add to their future pension and Social 
Security benefits by electing to participate in the New York State Deferred 
Compensation Plan.
Other Benefits:
Open enrollment is the time to review any of the optional benefits or services 
offered by the City....19
APOU proffered a number of witnesses who testified, without contradiction, that 
over time, the City had made representations that healthcare coverage received by an 
employee while employed would continue through retirement.20 Even Personnel 
Director Lyons confirmed that when she was first hired by the City, the City informed her
19 Joint Ex 2.
20 See testimony of: Charles Barthe who testified that he first learned of this in 1996 
when hired (Tr, at p. 27); James Teller who began working for the City 1975 and retired 
in 2007 (Tr, at p. 42); Christian Mesley, a former president of APOU (Tr, at p.64); 
Thomas McGraw whom the City hired in 1990 and was on disability retirement at the 
time of the hearing but was still considered employed (Tr, at p.85) ; Richard Nowosielski 
who came on the police force in 1973 (Tr, at pp. 98, 104); Donna Whalen who at the 
time had been working for the City for 23 years (T r, at pp. 113, 114, 119); and Rosalind 
Weatherholtz who had been employed by the city since 1986 (T r, at pp. 136-138).
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that when she retired, she "would have health insurance free of charge for the rest of 
[her] life.”21 The City argued below to the ALJ that if there was a past practice, it would 
have been the provision of health coverage, in general, and not any specific coverage to 
retirees. Through a number of witnesses, it was also presented that this included 
reimbursement for Medicare Part B coverage and coverage in the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield Extended Benefits Plan.22 Significantly, with minor variations in testimony, they 
confirmed that, while not mentioned when hired, they all had learned during their 
employ (during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s) that the City would reimburse them for 
Medicare Part B payments in retirement. It was also not disputed that the City’s 
withdrawal of this benefit was not negotiated with APOU.23
Thomas McGraw, an employee of the City’s Police Department who held the 
rank of detective at the time of the hearing, testified that as of May 2011, the City had 
"submitted” his name under the federal Social Security Law for disability retirement 
benefits pursuant to which he would be covered by Medicare Part B. He learned, 
contrary to his understanding of benefits available from the City theretofore, that he 
would be paying the cost of the Medicare Part B premiums rather than the City.24
Lyons explained that the Medicare Advantage Plan which the City was now 
offering in lieu of other plans, did not provide certain benefits previously available, such
21 Tr, at p. 179.
22 See note 13, supra.
23 Tr, at pp. 236-237.
24 Tr, at pp. 91-94, 242-243.
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as pediatric care and pediatric vitamins "added things that would be more advantageous 
for someone who may be 65 or older,” such as hearing, vision and dental. According to 
Lyons, hearing, vision and dental benefits were not provided to active employees under 
the City's Wrap-Around or Extended Benefits plans.25
Lyons testified that the City did not advise its active employees of the changes to
Blue Shield Medicare PPO or CDPHP Medicare choices that would be implemented for
retirees because it considered retiree health insurance to be "completely separate from
the active employee health insurance.”26 She further explained:
So active employees receive one memo with all of the 
changes that would affect their health insurance or their 
options, and then we do a separate mail-out to the retirees, 
and those individuals, this says retirees and participants. It 
could be COBRA individuals or people that are out of work 
paying contributor. They're on a different policy than these 
individuals.27
Lyons testified that, as of the second day of hearings, there were approximately 
400 active employees who were members of APOU. When asked, during cross­
examination, if "...according to the change in the practice now they will not receive the 
reimbursement for Medicare Part B,” Lyons replied, "[t]hat is correct.” Lyons agreed 
that this change was not negotiated with APOU, testifying, "But it changed prior retiree 
policy. We had a change to the retiree, the Medicare, the way we were handling it.”28
25 Tr, at pp. 197-198.
26 Tr, at pp. 193-194.
27 Tr, at p. 236.
28 Tr, at p. 237.
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Lyons also testified, during cross-examination, that the City continues to offer 
both the extended benefits and wrap-around health insurance plans for active, 
unionized employees, and that retirees had the same options until the January 1,2010 
change. Finally, Lyons agreed that the plans offered to retirees after January 1,2010 
contained different benefits with increased costs.29
DISCUSSION
We do not reach the issues upon which the ALJ grounded her decision because
we find that, contrary to APOU’s contention in its exceptions, the evidence did not
suffice to establish an enforceable past practice. In Chenango Forks Central School
District, the Board reaffirmed what it termed:
our most authoritative statement regarding the applicable 
test for the establishment of a binding past practice: the 
practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted 
for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances to 
create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit 
employees that the practice would continue.30
As the Court of Appeals has glossed this Board’s decisions, in affirming its 
analysis, "the expectation of the continuation of the practice is something that may be 
presumed from its duration with consideration of the specific circumstances under which
29 Tr, at pp. 80, 237.
30 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB ^ 3012 (2007), remanded, 42 PERB ^ 
4527 (2009), affd, 43 PERB ^ 3017 (2010), confd sub nom Chenango Forks Cent Sch 
Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 AD3d 1479, 45 PERB ^ 7006 (3d Dept 2012), 
affd, 21 NY3d 255, 46 PERB ^ 7008 (2013) (discussing and quoting County of Nassau, 
24 PERB ^ 3029, 3058 (1991) (quotation and editing marks omitted).
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the practice has existed.”31 Moreover, as the Board has noted, "in Chenango Forks we 
emphasized that the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to 
determine whether an enforceable past practice has been established.”32 An 
examination of the facts and circumstances at issue here, however, compel the 
conclusion that the ill-defined nature of the alleged past practice and the changes in 
circumstances over the years preclude a finding of an enforceable past practice.
The documentary evidence clearly establishes that the City changed the benefits 
available to retirees and members upon retirement in 2008, in terms of the available 
range of plans, and thus associated benefits available, as well as altering prescription 
drug coverage and associated costs to enrollees in the form of copayments for both 
office visits and prescriptions. Moreover, the City explicitly stated that “[ujnder the City’s 
current policy, the City will reimburse you the Medicare Part B premium on a monthly 
basis.”33 These changes, communicated in 2008,and implemented in 2009 without any 
objection from the APOU, are inconsistent with any prior reasonable expectation that 
may or may not have existed that benefits to retirees, whether conceived of as such or 
as future benefits to current employees, would remain unchanged. Far from evincing an 
unequivocal intention to continue uninterrupted continuation of the past coverage, the 
City’s 2008 changes interrupted any such alleged practice, as it eliminated or altered
31 Town of Islip v NYS Pub Empl Relation Bd, 23 NY3d 482, 492, 47 PERB fl 7002 
(2014) (citing and quoting Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 21 NY3d at 263 (quoting County of Nassau, 24 PERB fl 3029, at 3058).
32 North Colonie Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3028, 3123 (2008).
33 Joint Ex 3, at 2 (emphasis added).
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various plans and benefits, and the City’s qualification of its reimbursement of Medicare 
Part B premium expenses as paid "under the City’s current policy” served to provide 
notice that such policy could not be relied upon to continue indefinitely. Under these 
circumstances, we find that the APOU did not carry its burden and failed to prove the 
existence of an enforceable past practice. In fact, it appears that the City was allowed 
to modify and adjust the provisions of the health plan options multiple times, including 
reimbursement for Medicare Part B premiums, without objection or challenge by the 
APOU, thereby, one could argue, setting policy as to how health insurance 
modifications would be made. Accordingly, the charge was properly dismissed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is affirmed, and the
charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed.
DATED: November 10, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES UNION,
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-30395
- and -
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE and 
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER,
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HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (JOHN R. SACCOCIO, of counsel), for 
Charging Party
MARTIN, SHUDT, WALLACE, DiLORENZO & JOHNSON (CARLO C. DE 
OLIVEIRA and DAVID T. GARVEY of counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on remittitur from the Appellate Division, Third
Department.1 Although that Court confirmed our finding that Hudson Valley
Community College had violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’
Fair Employment Act (Act) the Court modified as to the remedy, stating:
There is, however, some record evidence supporting 
petitioner's claim that determinations regarding 
reinstatement and back pay are impracticable as to certain 
second jobs that were infrequent and voluntary. Although 
some of the second jobs that petitioner stopped offering to 
NIEU members were formerly held by specific, identifiable 
individuals who worked regularly scheduled hours, others— 
such as assisting at student orientation events—were not 
regularly scheduled or assigned to particular individuals, but
1 Hudson Valley Community Coll v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, AD3d
2015 NY Slip Op 07731 (3d Dept Oct 22, 2015).
instead were available on a sporadic basis to those who 
chose to sign up for them. PERB's remedial order cannot be 
reasonably applied to these positions, as it cannot be 
determined who would have claimed the positions, how 
many hours they would have worked, and how much back 
pay is owed. We thus remit the matter to PERB for a 
determination as to which NIEU members can be reinstated 
to second jobs that they previously held or should receive 
back pay.2
Pursuant to the mandate of the Appellate Division, Third Department, we 
remand the matter to the Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings, 
consistent with the Court’s opinion, to compile an appropriate record and to 
fashion an appropriate remedy for the violation.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the matter is hereby remanded for 
further proceedings to compile an appropriate record and to fashion an 
appropriate remedy for the violation found by the Board and confirmed by the 
Court.
DATED: November 10, 2015
Albany, New York
2 Id., at *2.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
NEAL MADNICK,
Charging Party,
CASE NO. U-30752
- and -
BELLMORE-MERRICK CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL 
DISTRICT,
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LEWIS, CLIFTON & NIKOLAIDIS, P.C. (LOUIE NIKOLAIDIS of counsel), for
Charging Party
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (CHRISTOPHER M. POWERS of counsel), for
Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Bellmore-Merrick Central High 
School District (District) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 After a 
hearing, the ALJ found that the District had violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by not selecting Neal Madnick for the position of 
boys’ varsity assistant coach in retaliation for protected activity in his capacity as a 
representative of the Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers (BMUST). The ALJ 
ordered that the District not consider Madnick’s activity as a BMUST representative in 
considering him for a coaching position, and ordered make whole relief and a posting.
EXCEPTIONS
The District excepts to the ALJ’s order on several grounds. First, the District 
asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that Madnick had established a prima facie case 1
1 47 PERB 4554 (2014).
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that the District’s decision not to appoint him to the coaching position was in retaliation 
for his protected activity. Second, the District contends that the record does not support 
the ALJ’s determination that Saul Lerner, the District’s director of athletics, physical 
education, health, and driver and adult education, decided to not hire Madnick. The 
District alleges as its third and fourth exceptions that the record likewise does not 
support the ALJ’s findings that Lerner had knowledge of Madnick’s protected activity, 
and that such activity was the "but for” cause of the decision not to hire Madnick.
The District’s fifth and sixth exceptions maintain that the ALJ erred in finding that 
a series of uncommon and irregular steps were taken in determining to hire a coach 
other than Madnick, and in holding, based in part on that conclusion, that the District’s 
proferred legitimate business reason was pretextual. Rather, the District asserts that 
the ALJ’s finding of pretext disregarded the probative evidence, and warrants reversal.
FACTS
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision and are summarized here only 
as necessary to address the exceptions before us. Madnick joined the staff of Sanford 
H. Calhoun High School (Calhoun) as a social studies teacher in September 2000. He 
became a BMUST building representative in September 2002, and a grievance 
representative in 2006, and served in both capacities until the fall of 2010. BMUST 
generally initiates few grievances; in the four years that Madnick served as the 
grievance representative, it filed four grievances, all initiated by Madnick.
Fred Harrison, who served as head building representative in Calhoun from 1975 
until his retirement in June 2010, led settlement efforts prior to the filing of a grievance; 
when a grievance became necessary Madnick formulated it and presented it to 
BMUST’s board for approval. Madnick would not represent BMUST in the grievance
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process, but continued to assist the grievant as necessary. Brian Moeller, a social 
studies teacher in Calhoun since 2004, described Madnick as the "go to” man when it 
came to grievances and union representation in the building. Three of the grievances 
Madnick was involved in were addressed in the charge and in the hearing.
The first grievance was filed on behalf of a Calhoun guidance counselor who was 
not re-hired for the 2008-2009 school year as girls’ junior varsity basketball coach at 
Mepham High School, with the position being filled by an out-of-District candidate. The 
grievance was settled on May 6, 2009, awarding the grievant $2,000 for lost pay and 
revising the District’s guidelines for posting of coaching positions to provide that "an out- 
of-district candidate may be selected to fill a coaching vacancy instead of a Unit I 
member if the administration determines in its discretion that the out-of-district 
candidate is more qualified for the position.”2
The second grievance also arose in 2008, and alleged that teachers were no 
longer being given preference in the assignment of paid supervision of after-school 
athletic events, but that the assignments were being given to nonunit persons who were 
not otherwise employed by the District. Madnick and Harrison repeatedly raised the 
issue over nearly two years with Calhoun’s principal, David Seinfeld, and BMUST 
ultimately filed a grievance. Harrison testified that Madnick kept track of who was being 
hired to perform that work and that, each time he and Madnick discussed the matter 
with Seinfeld, Seinfeld brought their concerns to Lerner, which made Seinfeld 
uncomfortable. Harrison also testified that Madnick’s persistence led Seinfeld to
2 Charging Party’s Ex 8. "Unit I” refers to BMUST’s negotiating unit.
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describe him to Harrison as "a pain in the ass.”3 Madnick testified that his repeatedly 
raising the issue of supervisory assignments strained his relationship with Seinfeld.
Finally, Madnick initiated a grievance filed on Moeller’s behalf that went to 
arbitration. After the 2009-2010 school year, Moeller was not re-hired as the boys’ 
assistant varsity football coach and the boys’ assistant varsity basketball coach, under 
Jay Kreutzberger, who was also a BMUST representative at Calhoun.
According to the arbitrator’s award in the case, "the decision to withhold 
[Moeller’s] reappointment as assistant football coach was made because Seinfeld 
disagreed with the professional views expressed by Moeller” as part of "a contractual 
process established in order to promote teacher involvement in curriculum 
development.”4 The arbitrator ultimately found that "the District’s action withholding the 
2010 assistant football coach assignment from Moeller violated his contractual right to 
support his proposal [for a new social studies course], which was pending before the 
Curriculum Committee.”5
The removal of Moeller from his coaching positions was controversial, as testified 
to both by Madnick and Mara Bollettieri, the assistant superintendent for personnel and 
administration. Madnick and Douglas Smested, who had replaced Harrison as the new 
head building representative in Calhoun, represented Moeller at the initial steps of the 
grievance, meeting with Seinfeld several times to advocate on Moeller’s behalf. On July 
7, 2010, BMUST filed a grievance on Moeller’s behalf challenging the letter to his file 
and his removal from coaching.
3 Tr, at p. 204.
4 Charging Party’s Ex 25, at 34.
5 Id. The arbitrator found that insufficient evidence had been presented to establish that 
Moeller was denied reappointment to the basketball position because of activity 
presented by the agreement. Id., at 35.
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In September 2010, on the first day of school, BMUST held a faculty-only 
meeting at Calhoun. During that meeting, Madnick discussed Moeller’s grievance and 
stated that BMUST was supporting Moeller, that Lerner was out to get Moeller, that 
"Saul tried to ‘F’ Mr. Moeller”6 and that, even though Lerner "was planning on screwing 
Mr. Moeller over,”7 BMUST was backing him and planning on taking his grievance to 
arbitration.
Madnick testified that, one or two days after the BMUST meeting, he learned that 
Learner had heard of and was displeased by Madnick’s comments. Madnick testified 
that Smested relayed to him that Seinfeld had said that there was "consternation”8 in 
central administration regarding Madnick’s comments about Lerner during the union 
meeting. Also, Madnick testified that BMUST president Michael Dolber had informed 
him that central building administrators had expressed to him that they were "very 
unhappy”9 about Madnick’s comments. Madnick testified that Boelletierri also let him 
know that she was dissatisfied with the comments he made in the September 2010 
meeting and that she was thereafter not as friendly towards him as she had previously 
been.
Madnick remained involved throughout the arbitration process, although other 
BMUST representatives were Moeller’s primary representatives after the initial stage.
On September 14, 2011, the arbitrator issued an on the record interim decision 
restoring Moeller to his football coaching position and awarding back pay. That decision 
was confirmed in a written award dated December 22, 2011, sustaining the grievance.
6 Tr, at p. 137.
7 Id.
8 Tr, at p. 340.
9 Id.
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Madnick also advocated for teachers in matters that were resolved without the 
filing of a grievance. According to Harrison, the fact that issues were hotly contested in 
Calhoun, but not in other District schools, caused problems for Seinfeld. Harrison 
testified that both Seinfeld and the previous Calhoun principal told him that they were 
pressured by central administration to explain why so many issues arose in Calhoun in 
comparison to other schools and that central administration viewed the difference to be 
Madnick’s advocacy. Harrison further testified that the administrative structure in the 
District is small and that a reference to "central administration” could only mean one of 
three or four people, including Lerner.10 1Harrison further testified that the principal prior 
to Seinfeld showed him a letter from the prior superintendent asking him what he was 
going to do to bring "Calhoun under control.”11
In September 2010, the District posted as vacant Moeller’s former position of 
boys’ varsity assistant basketball coach and that of boys’ junior varsity basketball coach. 
Applicants were required to submit their resumes and be interviewed. Moeller and 
Madnick similarly testified that the prior common practice had been to appoint coaches 
without an interview. Both Moeller and Madnick applied for the boys’ varsity assistant 
basketball coach position.
The practice in the District has been to give preference to District teachers when 
hiring coaches and, among teachers within the District, to prefer teachers who work in 
the same school as the team to be coached.
Madnick testified in detail regarding his basketball coaching experience. He 
became involved in coaching basketball when he was 18 years old and continued
10 Tr, at pp. 211-212.
11 Tr, at p. 209.
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coaching at successively higher levels until September 2000, when he began working 
for the District. His last coaching position was that of head basketball coach for another 
public school district’s high school during the 1997-1998 school year. Madnick never 
sought a coaching position in the District until September 2010, when he applied for the 
basketball coaching position that Moeller previously held.
Madnick testified that, although he had not actively coached since 2000, he has 
kept his basketball coaching skills up to date and has continued to hone his coaching 
skills by discussing the game with college and high school coaches, attending the 
practices of another coach at a private school, attending basketball games, reading 
sports and coaching literature and attending basketball games at Calhoun.
Kreutzberger and Moeller often consulted with Madnick about basketball coaching 
techniques, as did parents who coached basketball outside the District.
The District received eight applications for the positions, including those of 
Moeller, Madnick and Thomas Rottkamp, who was hired for the junior varsity position. 
Only Moeller and Madnick were in-District applicants. Contrary to the District’s 
established procedures, the out-of-District candidates were interviewed before the in­
District candidates. After BMUST complained about this change from established 
practice, the District interviewed the in-District applicants and then re-interviewed the 
out-of-District candidates.
Generally, when interviews were conducted for coaching positions, they were 
conducted by the head coach and a building administrator. Lerner did not normally 
attend interviews. In the fall of 2010, Lerner attended the interviews conducted to fill the 
Calhoun basketball coaching positions. A script was used to interview the candidates, 
with all the candidates being asked the same questions. According to Lerner, Madnick
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stated that he was only interested in the varsity position, and only if Moeller did not 
receive it. Kreutzberger testified that that Moeller and Madnick were his first and 
second choices to fill the boys’ varsity assistant basketball coach position.
The day after his interview, Seinfeld called Madnick into his office and asked him 
why he had applied for the position. Madnick told Seinfeld that he applied because 
Kreutzberger had asked him to, that he knew and had a positive relationship with half of 
the students who were on the team and would, therefore, not have to earn the students’ 
trust, and that he wanted to help Kreutzberger and Calhoun.
In mid-October 2010, Madnick asked to meet with Bollettieri to discuss the 
process being followed to fill the basketball coaching positions in Calhoun. According 
to Madnick, Bolletierri told him that Seinfeld had spoken highly of his work in the 
classroom and said to him, "Neal, you are so negative, if only we didn’t have all this 
negativity. How can you expect Mr. Lerner to hire you when you said such negative 
things about him?”12
Madnick testified that on October 27, 2010, Seinfeld told him that he was not 
going to be appointed as the boys’ varsity assistant basketball coach, although no other 
candidate had yet been hired. Seinfeld did not give him a reason for that decision.
On November 2, 2010, Kreutzberger learned that Ben Fisher, a teacher at 
Mephan High School and the boys’ junior varsity coach at that school, had been offered 
the position of boys’ assistant varsity basketball coach at Calhoun. Fisher sent 
Kreutzberger an e-mail in which he states that he was "recently hired”13 as his 
basketball assistant and that he wanted to talk to him about the circumstances
12 Tr, at pp. 360-361.
13 Charging Party’s Ex, at 34.
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surrounding his hire. Kreutzberger testified that he was surprised by the contents of 
Fisher’s e-mail, because he had not been consulted about hiring Fisher and had not 
heard that Fisher had applied for the position. Kreutzberger met with Fisher the same 
day in Calhoun. Madnick and Dolber were also present. During that meeting, Fisher 
stated that he had not sought the position and that Lerner had approached him and 
offered it to him. Kreutzberger told Fisher that Moeller had filed a grievance challenging 
his removal from the position. Madnick told him that he had also applied for the position 
and he showed Fisher his resume. After that meeting, Fisher called Lerner and 
declined the position. Seinfeld learned of the meeting, conducted an investigation and, 
on November 12, 2010, issued letters to Madnick and Kreutzberger that were copied to 
their personnel files regarding their conduct during their meeting with Fisher.
Ultimately, Jester Bates, an out-of-District candidate with little or no coaching 
experience, was hired to fill the boys’ assistant varsity basketball coaching position.
DISCUSSION
When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully motivated retaliation in 
violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, the charging party has the burden of 
demonstrating three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: a) that the affected 
individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known to the 
person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment action would 
not have been taken "but for” the protected activity.14
Where "a charging party establishes a prima facie case of unlawful motivation 14
14 Village of Endicott, 47 PERB fl 3017, 3050 (2014), citing UFT, Local 2, AFT-CIO 
(Jenkins), 41 PERB fl 3007 (2008), confd sub nom Jenkins v n Ys Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 41 PERB fl 7007 (Sup Ct New York County 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB fl 
7008 (1st Dept 2009); State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 
PERB fl 3021 (2013); see also City of Salamanca, 18 PERB fl 3012 (1985).
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through circumstantial evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to
rebut the inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that the employment action or
conduct was motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason.”15 If the
respondent establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts
back to the charging party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is
pretextual. At all times, however, "the burden of proof rests with the charging party to
establish the requisite causation under the Act by a preponderance of evidence.”16
In arguing that the ALJ erred in finding a violation, the District asserts that “[cjase
law has held that the burden to show animus is quite high and will not be found by a
mere nexus in time or prior disagreements between the parties that are vague or too
remote in time.”17 While the latter part of the proposition is true, the former is not. As
the standard we have long employed, articulated again here, makes clear, the charging
party must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence, and not by any higher
standard. Moreover, as to the establishment of a prima facie case:
At minimum, the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove a 
prima facie case must be sufficient to give rise to an inference 
that unlawfully motivated interference or discrimination was a 
factor in the employer's conduct. This relatively low initial 
evidentiary threshold for establishing a prima facie case in 
circumstantial evidence cases is necessitated by the principles
15 Dutchess Community College, 47 PERB fl 3018, 3056 (2014), citing UFT (Jenkins), 
41 PERB fl 3007, at 3018.
16 Id., quoting UFT (Jenkins), 41 PERB fl 3007, at 3043.
17 District Memorandum of Law in Support of Exceptions at 11. Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City of New York, 35 PERB fl 3002, 3004 (2002), relied 
upon by the District, contains no such language as to the burden of proof, but merely 
holds that "timing alone is insufficient to establish the ‘but for’ element of a § 209-a.1(a) 
or (c) violation.” The other case cited by the District for this proposition, State of New 
York (Department of Correctional Services), 32 PERB fl 4564 (1999), is likewise devoid 
of any such language, but did find "conclusory testimony regarding ‘arguments’” too 
vague to establish anti-union animus, and found other incidents too remote in time to 
give rise to a finding of animus.
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underlying §§ 209-a. 1(a) and (c) of the Act along with the lack of 
discovery and the pleading requirements under our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). Although the timing and the context of 
events alone in a circumstantial evidence case may not be 
sufficient to meet a charging party's ultimate burden of proof, the 
timing and context of an employer's conduct may be sufficient to 
establish an inference of improper motivation, thereby shifting 
the burden of persuasion to the respondent to come forward with 
evidence demonstrating a non-discriminatory basis for the 
alleged conduct.18
Here, the ALJ found a prima facie case based upon circumstantial evidence. On 
the first prong of the showing, that Madnick participated in protected activity, there is no 
dispute. On the second prong, that the employer was aware of Madnick’s protected 
activity, the District excepts to the ALJ’s focus on Lerner’s knowledge and to her 
refusing to credit Lerner’s denial of knowledge of Madnick’s protected activity.
As a threshold matter, the District’s exception to the statement in the ALJ’s 
decision that "the record is clear that it was Lerner who made the decision not to hire 
Madnick” is not persuasive, for several reasons.19 First, Lerner testified to precisely that 
effect.20 Moreover, the ALJ immediately follows the statement excepted to by stating 
that the decision was "reached at a meeting with Lerner, Bollettieri, and Seinfeld,” and 
that "it was Lerner who opposed selecting Madnick for the coaching job,” with Seinfeld 
arguing in favor of Madnick, and Bollettieri mediating between them.21 This statement is 
consistent with Lerner’s own testimony, and that of Bolletieri. The ALJ’s summary of the 
facts is likewise consistent with Seinfeld’s testimony that in reaching a final decision, he
18 UFT (Jenkins), 41 PERB fl 3007, at 3043.
19 Exceptions at fl 3, quoting 47 PERB fl 4554, at 4717.
20 Tr, at pp. 611-612, 613-614; The ALJ’s reliance on that testimony is not inappropriate, 
although Lerner also described the decision as being one made by himself and the 
principal with the approval of the Board and Bollettieri. Tr, at p. 578.
21 47 PERB fl 4554, at 5717; see Tr, at pp. 860, 870.
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deferred to Lerner’s basketball expertise,22 and Bollettieri’s testimony that Lerner and 
Seinfeld "have much more expertise, both of them, than I do, so I heard them both out,” 
after which a decision was made.23 The ALJ’s conclusion that Lerner effectively 
wielded the casting vote is wholly consistent with Lerner’s testimony, and that of 
Seinfeld and Bollettieri.
In finding Lerner’s denial that he was aware of Madnick’s protected activity not
credible, the ALJ relied upon several factors. First, she found, Lerner’s own testimony
was inconsistent with his purported lack of knowledge:
[Lerner] testified that he had heard that Madnick had played 
a role in the Murray grievance, that Madnick’s name came 
up "a lot” and that he knew Madnick to be an "activist.”
Lerner further stated that he knew that Madnick had 
criticized central administration and had referred to it as a 
den of vipers and to administrators as clowns and that 
Madnick had made many comments about the ability of the 
central office staff. Lerner testified that he would hear of 
Madnick’s comments about the central office through 
different people, that the District "is a small community” and 
that things "filter back” to him. When asked if he had heard 
that Madnick was involved in the Moeller grievance, he 
stated that he knew of no direct role that Madnick played in 
that grievance, but that there was a lot of "noise” and that 
Madnick is not shy about expressing his opinion.24
Second, the ALJ noted "that Madnick was involved in several grievances that 
affected Lerner’s department and that the filing of formal grievances is unusual in the 
District.”25 Third, the ALJ found relevant "the fact that, as testified to by both Bollettieri 
and Lerner, the District is small and administrators hear of comments made by teachers 
in the schools,” including comments made by Madnick about Lerner in the context of the
22 Tr, at pp. 774-775.
23 Tr, at p. 871.
24 47 PERB ^ 4554, at 4715 (footnotes omitted) (citing Tr, at pp. 658, 659, 660-661).
25 Id., at 4717.
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Moeller grievance.26
The ALJ’s conclusion was further buttressed by Madnick’s testimony, which she 
deemed credible, that BMUST’s president had told him that the administration was "very 
unhappy” about Madnick’s comments, and that the new building representative had 
likewise "told him that there was consternation in central administration regarding his 
comments about Lerner.”27 The ALJ also found credible Madnick’s testimony that 
Bollettieri had expressly said to him, "How can you expect Mr. Lerner to hire you when 
you said such negative things about him?”28
Finally, the ALJ also found credible, "based upon his demeanor,” Harrison’s 
testimony that he and Madnick raised an assignment grievance with Principal Seinfeld 
"repeatedly over two years and that, each time Madnick raised the issue, Seinfeld had 
to raise the issue with Lerner and that doing so made Seinfeld uncomfortable.”29
Credibility determinations by an ALJ are generally entitled to "great weight unless 
there is objective evidence in the record compelling a conclusion that the credibility 
finding is manifestly incorrect. This is especially true where, as here, the credibility 
determination rests in part on the witness’ demeanor.”30 The District has pointed to no
26 Id., at 4717-4718. Bollettieri’s testimony, in particular, linked Madnick’s "tension with 
Mr. Lerner” and the fact that "[t]he relationship wasn’t a positive one” to the Madnick’s 
involvement in the Moeller grievance. Tr, at pp. 926-927.
27 Id., at 4718.
28 47 PERB fl 4554, at 4718.
29 Id.
30 UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB fl 3004 (2015), quoting County of Clinton, 47 PERB fl 3026, 
3079 (2014) and Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3005, at 3019 (2008); 
citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB fl 3016, at 3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 
41 PERB fl 3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 23 PERB fl 3049 (1990); Hempstead 
Housing Auth, 12 PEr B fl 3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 PERB fl3034 
(1977); see also County of Ulster, 39 Pe r B fl 3013, at 3045-3046 (citing Fashion 
Institute of Technology v Helsby, 44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB fl 7005, 7009 (1st Dept 1974)) 
(deference due credibility determinations based on observation of witness's demeanor).
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such objective evidence tending to support Lerner’s claim of ignorance of Madnick’s 
protected activity. Accordingly, we decline to overturn the ALJ’s credibility 
determination and her resultant factual finding that Lerner knew of Madnick’s protected 
activity.
In support of the prima facie case, the ALJ did not rest solely on the basis of a 
temporal proximity between Madnick’s protected activity and the decision to hire 
another applicant. Rather, she pointed to several factors, including that "Lerner viewed 
Madnick as a thorn in the administration’s side,” and his testimony that "he and most 
administrators did not think well of Madnick.”31 In particular, she noted that, as the 
quality of Madnick’s teaching was not disputed, Lerner’s union advocacy seemed to be 
the cause. This finding is buttressed by the fact that Lerner did not testify to any other 
grounds for his disapproval of Madnick; indeed, he testified that "I have never spoken to 
Mr. Madnick except on rare occasions about basketball.”32 The lack of any other 
articulated basis for the low opinion Lerner (and, by his account, other administrators) 
had of Madnick inferentially supports that it was in response to his protected activity.
Likewise, the ALJ relied upon the general tenor and overall context of labor 
relations in the District, including some of the facts relied upon to demonstrate 
knowledge of Madnick’s protected activity, and an arbitration award finding that Moeller 
had been denied a coaching position in retaliation for his exercise of his contractual 
rights to participate in the curriculum process.33
We do, however, find that the ALJ erred in relying on one factor in finding a prima 
facie case. The District reasonably points out that, in view of the fact it knew that
31 47 PERB 4554, at 4718; see also Tr, at p. 663.
32 Tr, at p. 570.
33 Charging Party’s Ex, 25.
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Madnick did not wish to be considered for the junior varsity coaching position, any 
"uncommon and irregular steps” by the District taken solely with respect to that position 
are not probative of discriminatory or retaliatory bias against Madnick, and therefore are 
not probative of his prima facie case. We agree. However, this does not invalidate the 
ALJ’s finding, not excepted to by the District, of similar "uncommon and irregular steps” 
taken as to Lerner’s making an unsolicited offer of the assistant varsity coach position to 
Fischer, despite the District’s practice of giving preference to teachers, such as 
Madnick, who work within the same school as the team they would be coaching.34
The District’s assertion that those factors are not sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case is not persuasive. As we held in Jenkins, it is sufficient if the circumstantial 
evidence "under the totality of the circumstances,” suggests that the adverse 
employment action complained of "may have been unlawfully motivated in violation of 
the Act.”35 The evidence here is ample to meet that burden, and the ALJ did not err in 
finding that Madnick established a prima facie case.
The District has put forward as legitimate business reasons for the hiring of Bates 
over Madnick that Lerner felt that the 12 year gap since Madnick had last coached 
rendered his skills outdated; that the basketball program at Calhoun was floundering 
under Kreutzberger’s leadership; that Bates "interviewed exceptionally well and came 
with incredible recommendations”; and that he had played varsity basketball with a 
coach whom Lerner considered to be one of the best in the region and in college, where
34 47 PERB ^ 4554, at 4718. Other irregularities, such as the interviewing of out-of­
District candidates first, and then re-interviewing them after the in-district candidate 
were interviewed, the lack of consultation with Kreutzberger in making an offer to 
Fischer, and in turning down Madnick, and the fact that the ALJ credited Madnick’s 
testimony that he was informed that he was out of consideration prior to the selection of 
a candidate, further support the ALJ’s finding.
35 41 PERB H 3007, at 3045.
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"he played for one of the most highly respected coaches in the country.”36 The District 
also complains that "the ALJ failed to take into consideration that, after Bates was hired, 
the team did significantly better.”37
To address the last point first, we do not see the relevance of Bates’s 
performance subsequent to his hiring in establishing the District’s motivation in hiring 
him in preference to Madnick. In a case predicated on retaliation or discrimination, it is 
hornbook law that the legality of the decision is to be judged on what the employer knew 
at the time it made the decision, not on how subsequent events play out, or even on 
subsequently acquired evidence that might have justified the decision had it been 
known at the time.38 Events that happen after the decision are, therefore, simply not 
probative of the District’s motivation at the time the decision was made.
We recognize that "the review of the articulated business reasons offered by an 
employer in support of a management decision does not include the substitution of an 
ALJ's judgment for the judgment of the employer.”39 Rather, a proffered legitimate 
business reason is properly regarded as pretextual if the credible evidence establishes 
that the decision was not so motivated, either directly or circumstantially,40 or because
36 Exceptions at ^ 21.
37 Id., at ^ 22.
38 See, e.g., Margerum v City of Buffalo, 24 NY3d 721, 731 (2015), citing United States 
v Brennan, 650 F3d 65 (2d Cir 2011)); see also Corcoran v CHG-Meridian US Finance, 
Ltd., 2014 WL 1976671 (NDNY May15, 2014) ("after-acquired evidence of employee 
misconduct that was not the basis for the employer's decision to terminate the employee 
was not relevant for the purpose of determining whether the employer had violated the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ") (summarizing McKennon v Nashville Banner 
Pub Co, 513 US 352, 361 (1995)).
39 Town of North Hempstead, 35 PERB ^ 3027, 3075 (2002).
40 Dansville Support Staff Assn (Johnson), 45 PERB ^ 3012, 3027-3028 (2012); County 
of Saratoga, 37 PERB ^ 3024, 3069 (2004).
Case No. U-30752 -17-
the articulated reasons are so lacking in merit as to be patently false.41 The ALJ 
rejected the District’s legitimate business reasons on the former grounds, emphasizing 
behavior on the part of the District that was inconsistent with the rationales advanced, 
including that Kreutzberger received satisfactory evaluations as a coach, and that "no 
issues had previously been raised regarding his coaching,” and the absence of any 
other record evidence of a perceived need to improve Calhoun’s program.42 The ALJ 
further relied on her conclusion that Lerner’s offering the position to Fisher, who had not 
applied for the position, and whose "team was also at the bottom of the conference” was 
inconsistent with the purported need to improve the program as the reason for not hiring 
Madnick. The ALJ pointed out "there is no record evidence that Fisher had success in 
the past or that Lerner had other reason to believe that Fisher would improve the 
Calhoun team.”43 In sum, the ALJ concluded that the District’s behavior both before 
and during the hiring process for the boys’ assistant varsity coach position was not 
consistent with the legitimate business reason articulated by the District, leading to the 
conclusion that the rationale was not credible, but rather a post-hoc rationalization of the 
decision.
The District faults the ALJ for not finding credible Lerner’s testimony that the 
District’s goal "was to infuse a ‘floundering’ program with ‘new energy.’”44 However, the 
District does not provide any objective evidence undermining the ALJ’s credibility 
determination. Indeed, the District does not even address the reasons the ALJ gave for 
finding the proffered business reason to be pretextual, other than to reassert Lerner’s
41 Town of North Hempstead, 35 PERB fl 3027, at 3075.
42 47 PERB fl 4554, at 4719.
43 Id.
44 District’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Exceptions, at 19.
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testimony as credible.45
Accordingly, we find that the ALJ did not err in declining to credit the proffered 
rationale. This finding is also consistent with her previous finding, supported by the 
evidence, that Lerner had not testified credibly with regard to his knowledge of 
Madnick’s protected activity. Moreover, other factors in the record not expressly relied 
on by the ALJ also do not cohere with the District’s proffered legitimate business 
reason. Lerner’s admission that he did not ask Madnick any questions at his interview 
"about what he had done to keep up with basketball in the twelve years since he had 
last formally coached,” is in tension with his testimony that Madnick’s experience was 
outdated "was the principal reason he was not hired,” and does not support the rationale 
offered by the District.46 Nor does the fact that that Bates "had little or no coaching 
experience, although he had recently played college basketball and had worked as a 
graduate assistant in a college basketball program.”47 In sum, the record evidence, far 
from undermining the ALJ’s credibility determination, is consistent with it.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the District had 
violated §§ 209-a. 1(a) and (c) of the Act when it did not select Madnick in the fall of 
2010 for the position of boys’ varsity assistant basketball coach in retaliation for his
45 Id., at 17-19. The District does address the ALJ’s erroneous reliance on the 
"uncommon and irregular steps” in hiring Rottkamp. However, the ALJ does not rely on 
these steps in finding the District’s rationale for hiring Bates pretextual, but rather in 
finding the existence of a prima facie case. 47 PERB ^ 4554, at 4518, 4519. Thus, the 
ALJ’s misreading of the facts on this point does not taint her finding of pretext.
46 Tr, at pp. 686-687.
47 47 PERB H 4554, at 4715.
activity as a BMUST representative.48 However, under the highly atypical 
circumstances here, we believe the record should be further developed to determine 
what remedy is appropriate. We note that the existence of evidence of a merely 
conditional interest on Madnick’s part in the job, along with the existence of a candidate 
whom some evidence suggests was preferable to Madnick and other issues which 
present material issues of fact that should be clarified prior to applying our well 
established preference for make whole relief, which we reaffirm herein.
Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s finding of a violation, and remand for the
clarification of the record to determine an appropriate remedy.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
48 We note that we do not exercise plenary review over ALJ decisions, but rather, that 
any objections not specifically raised to the ALJ’s decision have been waived, and are 
not properly before us. § 213.2 (b)(4) PERB Rules of Procedure; Village of Endicott, 47 
PERB fl 3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014), citing City of Schenectady, 46 PERB fl 3025, at 3056, 
n. 8 (2013), confd sub nom Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, Index No. 4090/2011 (Sup Ct Albany Co July 9, 2014); Town of 
Orangetown, 40 PERB fl 3008 (2007), confd sub nom Matter of Town of Orangetown v 
NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 40 PERB fl 7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town of 
Walkill, 42 PERB fl 3006 (2009).
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (County) to 
a decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in which the ALJ held that 
the County violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment 
Act (Act).1 The ALJ found that the County’s Corrections Captain, Ronald Rogers, made 
certain remarks to rank and file corrections officers represented by the Nassau County 
Sheriff’s Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. (COBA) in retaliation for their 
efforts to obtain COBA’s assistance regarding issues concerning Rogers’s supervisory 
directives that affected their terms and conditions of employment. 1
1 47 PERB 4550 (2014).
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EXCEPTIONS
The County filed 34 exceptions to the ALJ’s decision and recommended order, 
challenging virtually all of her material findings of fact and each of her conclusions of 
law. They boil down to four arguments: 1) Rogers did not make the comments that the 
ALJ attributed to him; 2) Rogers’s comments to rank and file officers cannot constitute 
an interference with their exercise of protected rights because he is a member of 
COBA’s bargaining unit; 3) the County cannot be held liable for Rogers’s comments 
because there is no evidence that it authorized or condoned them, and; 4) Rogers’s 
comments cannot constitute retaliation or a threat of retaliation for the employees’ 
exercise of protected rights because he has no authority to effect changes in their terms 
and conditions of employment. COBA filed a response supporting the ALJ’s decision.
Having carefully reviewed the record as described below, and considered the 
County’s exceptions and COBA’s response, we affirm the decision of the ALJ in part 
and adopt her remedial order.
FACTS
COBA represents a collective negotiations unit of County employees under the 
general supervision of the Sheriff of Nassau County, Michael Spozotto.2 The 
employees hold titles within the County’s corrections department, including correction 
officers, corporals, lieutenants, and captains.3 The County’s corrections department is 
divided into several units, including an Operations Unit. The Operations Unit consists of
2 Because the Sherriff is an appointed position, the office of Sheriff is not a joint 
employer with the County. See County of Nassau and Nassau County Sheriff, 25 
PERB fl 3036 (1992).
3 See County of Nassau, 32 PERB fl 8001 (1999).
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approximately 40 officers deployed to security posts, admissions and discharge posts, 
identification and classification posts, and a court desk.4
At all relevant times, Captain Rogers commanded the Operations Unit.5 He was 
responsible for overseeing the Unit and increasing the efficiencies of daily operations.6 
He held that role until shortly after COBA filed the instant improper practice charge, at 
which time he ceased to supervise the Operations Unit.7 Notwithstanding Rogers’s 
supervisory responsibilities, as a captain, he is in COBA’s bargaining unit.
During three separate conversations in the fall of 2012, Correction Officer William 
Sutch, who had been assigned to the Operations Unit for 16 years, reported to COBA’s 
president, John Jaronczyk, its vice president, Frank Perez, and its second vice 
president, Corey Timo, that Rogers had issued certain verbal orders that changed 
written policies affecting the staffing of the Operations Unit.8 Sutch reported that the 
changes were causing safety and security issues due to a lack of post coverage, which 
affected the ability of officers to respond to emergencies.9
Sutch expressed his complaints to Timo just before Christmas 2012.10 1Timo 
reported Sutch’s concerns to Jaronczyk, who advised Timo that he had already spoken 
to the sheriff about them, but that he would do so again.11 In Timo’s presence,
4 Tr, at pp. 51,95, 113-114.
5 Tr, at p. 45.
6 Tr, at pp. 113, 144.
7 Tr, at pp. 47, 143. There is no evidence that Rogers’s departure from the Operations 
Unit is related to the instant improper practice charge.
8 Tr, at pp. 17-22, 31, 37-40, 54-58.
9 Id.
10 Tr, at pp. 18-20.
11 Tr, at p. 22
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Jaronczyk telephoned the sheriff and delivered the renewed complaint.12 The Sheriff 
assured Jaronczyk that "he would take care of it.”13
On January 1,2013, shortly after Jaronczyk’s Christmas complaint to the Sheriff 
and the Sheriff’s assurance that he would take care of it, Rogers made an unusual, out 
of uniform, unscheduled, off-duty holiday visit to the correctional facility.14 Sutch 
testified that at about 7:00 AM, Rogers entered the Admissions and Discharge office of 
the Operations Unit and ordered him to "get everybody in the office.”15 According to 
Sutch, the only on-duty correction officer who could not comply with Rogers’s order to 
assemble in the office was Daniel Hoffman, who was in the "bubble” -  a locked room 
from which secured doors in the facility are opened and closed.16
Sutch testified that Rogers opened the meeting stating: "You nitwits again have 
started off with making complaints.”17 Taken aback, Sutch responded that he resented 
the name-calling, stating: "I’m a grown man; I [don’t] need to be talked [to] like that.”18 
According to Sutch, Rogers continued, stating, "every time [you] contact the union it 
pisses the sheriff off and just draws more attention to our area, and that’s when things 
start to change.”19 To this, Sutch responded that it was he who contacted COBA and 
that "it was [his] right” to do so.20 According to Sutch, Rogers responded: "You do have
12 Id.
13 Tr, at p. 21.
14 Tr, at pp. 41,53.
15 Tr, at p. 59; ALJ Ex 2, at 10.
16 Tr, at p. 60.
17 Tr. pp. 43, 65.
18 Id.
19 Tr, at pp. 43-44.
20 Id.
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that right to go, but when you do you drag the spotlight on your Unit.”21 Rogers also 
said: "I’m just letting you know that every time you go, the spotlight comes down on you 
guys. You’re going to wind up changing the policies maybe your fellow officers might 
not like.”22 Rogers also warned that the employees should "learn to pick their battles.”23 
Sutch further testified that Rogers stated that "since we kept stirring the pot that 
he would close our unit down on weekends,” to which another officer, Richard Friedel, 
observed that the Unit could not be closed on weekends because the inmates have a 
variety of needs that require staffing the Unit.24 According to Sutch, Rogers responded: 
"The sheriff can do whatever he wants.”25 At that point, another officer, Monroe, 
commented that he (Monroe) had been "here nineteen years and it’s a shame that I get 
stressed [sic] like a child.”26 Rogers retorted that he had been there twenty-nine years 
and "I get treated like a child.”27 Monroe quipped back: "How does it feel after twenty- 
nine years being a captain officer, taking orders from a chef?”28 Finally, Sutch testified 
that others also commented on Rogers’s remarks, including Officer Scott Garranger.29 
According to Sutch, the meeting adjourned after about ten to fifteen minutes.30
21 Tr, at p. 70.
22 Tr, at p. 45.
23 Tr, at p. 170; ALJ Exhibit 2, 14.
24 Tr, at p. 62.
25 Id.
26 Tr, at p. 62.
27 Tr, at p. 63.
28 Tr, at p. 63. Sutch explained that the sheriff had once been a cook for the corrections 
department. Id.
29 Id.
30 Tr, at p. 87.
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Garranger, who could not recall exactly what Rogers said during his direct 
examination by COBA,31 testified on cross-examination by the County that when Rogers 
opened the meeting he asked "who was going to the Union with issues.”32 According to 
Garranger, Rogers said that the sheriff was not happy that complaints were being 
reported to COBA.33 Garranger testified that Rogers suggested that the Unit might be 
closed on weekends, to which another officer responded that the Unit required security 
staffing of "two or three guys” who might need to be called in from the identification unit 
where Garranger works.34 Although Garranger attributed the response to Corporal 
Scott Hilbrandt,35 at another stage in his testimony, he testified that Hilbrandt was not at 
the meeting.36
Rogers denied that he ordered corrections officers to assemble for a meeting in 
the Admissions and Discharge office.37 He testified that he occasionally visits the 
correctional facility when he is off duty "to check on different posts of the institution so 
that people don’t get comfortable knowing there is no boss around.”38 He recalled that 
on January 1,2013, he made such an off-duty visit to the correctional facility in order to 
"talk to the people . . . wish everybody a Happy New Year. . . , shake hands, see if I 
could see if there was anything going on with people on the post with people not on 
their posts . . . just routine supervisory issues.”39
31 Tr, at p. 97.
32 Tr, at p. 102.
33 Tr, at p. 106.
34 Tr, at p. 98.
35 Tr, at p. 99.
36 Tr, at p. 101.
37 Tr, at pp. 152-154, 156.
38 Tr, at p. 117.
39 Tr, at pp. 119, 180.
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According to Rogers, when he entered the Admissions and Discharge office, 
several employees, including Sutch, were complaining that they were not receiving as 
much pay as in the past due to a reduction in overtime.40 Rogers testified that he and 
Sutch had a conversation "about the union” in the presence of other officers in the 
office.41 According to Rogers, he told Sutch that around Christmas Eve, Perez had 
complained to him about staffing cuts in the "satellite” post.42 Rogers testified that he 
told Sutch: "[Y]ou know, you guys got to stop complaining, whoever it is got to stop 
complaining that things aren’t correct. Frank [Perez] told me that somebody complained 
that the post was cut, totally cut.”43 He testified that he told Sutch that the post had 
been merely reduced.44 Rogers explained that staff had to be redeployed to transport 
inmates to court and there was a complaint that "there wasn’t a full complement of staff 
then.”45
Rogers testified that, at some point during the meeting, an officer known to him 
only as "Vinny” chimed in stating: "I wish I knew who called the Union, I would like to 
straighten that person out.”46 Rogers responded: "This isn’t about calling the union; it’s 
about good information and bad information.”47 Rogers explained that he resents it 
when COBA reports employee complaints to the sheriff that are grounded on inaccurate 
information.48 He testified that to respond to such complaints, he must engage in time
40 Tr, at pp. 120-121.
41 Tr, at pp. 123, 179.
42 Tr, at p. 121.
43 Tr, at p. 121.
44 Tr, at p. 122.
45 Tr, at p. 122.
46 Tr, at p. 124.
47 Tr, at p. 124.
48 Tr, at p. 185.
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consuming efforts to "correct bad information” and "dispelling rumors” where he could 
be "doing other things.”49 He testified that he did not resent COBA reporting employees’ 
complaints to the Sheriff that are based on "good information.”50
Rogers did not recall calling anyone a nitwit.51 He similarly did not believe he 
said, "every time you go to the union you [are] bringing attention to this Unit.”52 Rogers 
flatly denied stating that he resented being treated like a child or that anyone asked him 
how it felt to be taking orders from a chef during the January 1,2013 meeting.53 
Likewise, he flatly denied suggesting that he would be closing the Operations Unit on 
weekends.54 According to Rogers, the conversation with Sutch simply faded out in less 
than half an hour.55
Later, in April 2013, COBA discussed Rogers’s orders with the sheriff again.
This time, the discussion occurred during a labor-management meeting. Indeed, the 
April 22 agenda for the April 25 meeting expressly listed as its third item of "Old 
Business” for discussion: "Operations Unit - status of Capt Rogers’s verbal orders 
changing SOPs in Operations Unit.”56 Timo explained that Jaronczyk’s December 2012 
complaints to the sheriff about Rogers’s orders made its way into the agenda because 
they had not been resolved to COBA’s satisfaction.57 According to Timo, during the 
labor-management meeting, the Sheriff said that he would stop the verbal orders that
49 Tr, at p. 165.
50 Tr, at pp. 162, 172-174.
51 Tr, at p. 130.
52 Tr, at pp. 130, 154, 159-160.
53 Tr, at p. 129.
54 Tr, at p. 136.
55 Tr, at p. 128.
56 Charging Party’s Ex 1.
57 Tr, at pp. 21-22.
Case No. U-32687 9
Rogers was issuing and end the new duties that operations officers had been 
assigned.58
Shortly after the agenda of the labor-management meeting was distributed to 
Sheriff Spozotto and COBA’s officials, Rogers had a conversation with Corporal 
Hilbrandt. Hilbrandt testified that on April 24, 2013, he was directed to meet with 
Rogers in the Transportation office.59 Referring to the April 22 agenda for the April 25 
labor-management meeting, Rogers told Hilbrandt that he had just been "reamed out by 
the sheriff” because of the complaints that had been lodged against him.60 According to 
Hilbrandt, Rogers went on to say that "every time you guys go to the office they put a 
spotlight on themselves.”61 Asked what he meant by "office,” Hilbrandt corrected 
himself, observing that he meant to say "union;” i.e., Rogers told him that "every time 
you guys go to the union you put a spotlight on yourself.”62 Hilbrandt testified that 
Rogers said that he was thinking about moving officers into security on weekends.63
Rogers had no recollection of the conversation with Hilbrandt.64 Specifically, he 
had no recollection of telling Hilbrandt that he had been "reamed out” by the sheriff due 
to his conduct at issue in the agenda for the labor-management meeting or telling 
Hilbrandt "once again you guys are back in the spotlight.”65 Indeed, he denied having 
spoken with the sheriff about the issues.66 However, he remembered speaking to
58 Tr, at pp. 26-29.
59 Tr, at pp. 81-82.
60 Tr, at p. 78.
61 Id.
62 Tr, at pp. 79, 84.
63 Tr, at p. 84.
64 Tr, at p. 135.
65 Tr, at p. 135.
66 Tr, at p. 132.
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COBA about them, recalling that the conversations were about his redeployment of 
corrections officers out of the Operations Unit to the court "to do meal reliefs.”67
DISCUSSION
When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully motivated interference with 
or retaliation for the exercise of protected rights in violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of 
the Act, the charging party has the burden of demonstrating three elements by a 
preponderance of the credible evidence: a) that the affected individual engaged in 
protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known to the person or persons 
taking the employment action; and c) the employment action would not have been taken 
"but for” the protected activity.68
Where "a charging party establishes a prima facie case of unlawful motivation 
through circumstantial evidence, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to 
rebut the inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that the employment action or 
conduct was motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason.”69 If the 
respondent establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden shifts 
back to the charging party to establish that the articulated non-discriminatory reason is 
pretextual. At all times, however, the burden of proof rests with the charging party to 
prove the requisite causation by a preponderance of the evidence.70
67 Tr, at p. 134.
68 Village of Endicott, 47 PERB fl 3017, 3050 (2014), citing UFT, L 2, AFT-CIO 
(Jenkins), 41 PERB fl 3007(2008), confd sub nom Jenkins v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 41 PERB fl 7007 (Sup Ct New York County 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB fl 
7008 (1st Dept 2009); State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 
PERB fl 3021 (2013); see also City of Salamanca, 18 PERB fl 3012 (1985).
69 Dutchess Community College, 47 PERB fl 3018, 3056 (2014), citing UFT (Jenkins), 
41 PERB fl 3007, at 3018.
70 Id., quoting UFT (Jenkins), 41 PERB fl 3007, at 3043.
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In the instant case, the County raises a barrage of objections to the ALJ’s factual 
determinations based on her overall conclusion that Rogers’s testimony was evasive 
and not credible where it conflicted with the testimony of COBA’s witnesses. However, 
credibility determinations by an ALJ are generally entitled to "great weight, unless there 
is objective evidence in the record compelling a conclusion that the credibility finding is 
manifestly incorrect. This is especially true where, as here, the credibility determination 
rests in part on the witness’s demeanor.”71 The County has pointed to no such 
objective evidence showing that the ALJ’s factual determinations were "manifestly 
incorrect.” Indeed, as discussed below, we find that the ALJ’s factual determinations 
are soundly supported by the record itself. Accordingly, we decline to overturn the 
ALJ’s credibility determinations and her resultant factual findings.
Rogers’s statements on January 1, 2013 
Contrary to the County’s arguments, we find that the record fully supports the 
ALJ’s findings concerning the January 1,2013 meeting. On that day, Rogers appeared 
at the Admissions and Discharge office of the Operations Unit in his capacity as 
commanding officer of the Unit. Upon his arrival, he ordered the on-duty officers to 
assemble. Once assembled, Rogers told the employees of his dissatisfaction with their 
complaints to COBA about his supervisory directives and COBA’s successful pursuit of
71 UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB fl 3004 (2015), petition dismissed sub nom Cruz v NYS Pub 
Empl Relations Bd, 48 p Er B fl 7003 (Sup Ct New York Co 2015) (quoting County of 
Clinton, 47 PERB fl 3026, 3079 (2014) and Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 
fl 3005, 3019 (2008); citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB fl 3016, 3062 (2011); Mount 
Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 23 PERB fl 3049 
(1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB fl 3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment 
Assn, 10 PERB fl 3034 (1977)); see also County of Ulster, 39 PERB fl 3013, 3045-3046 
(2006), citing Fashion Institute of Technology v Helsby, 44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB fl 7005, 
7009 (1st Dept 1974) (deference due credibility determinations based on observation of 
witness's demeanor).
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those complaints with the Sheriff. He told them that they should stop making their 
complaints and that if they persisted there would be consequences adverse to their 
employment interests, including the possibility that he would close the Operations Unit 
on weekends. Accordingly, we find that the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that 
the County violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, unless there is merit to the 
County’s defenses.
First, contrary to the County’s argument, the record supports the ALJ’s finding 
that Rogers appeared at the Admissions and Discharge office of the Operations Unit in 
his supervisory capacity. Rogers testified that he occasionally visits the facility during 
his off-duty hours to check on different posts of the institution so that the officers do not 
"get comfortable knowing there is no boss around.” He testified that he made such a 
visit on January 1,2013, to ensure that the posts were staffed -  "just routine 
supervisory issues.”72 Thus, Rogers’s own testimony supports the conclusion that he 
appeared at the Operations Unit on January 1,2013 in his supervisory capacity.
Second, contrary to the County’s arguments, the record supports the ALJ’s 
conclusion that once Rogers arrived at the Operations Unit, he ordered the on-duty 
officers to assemble in the Admissions and Discharge office. Despite Rogers’s general 
denial and inability to recall the event, the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Sutch’s 
detailed recollection of the order should be credited. Sutch recalled that the only 
employee who could not comply with Rogers’s order was locked in the bubble, 
supporting his recollection that the assembly was pursuant to a directive. Indeed, the
72 Tr, at p. 119.
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County’s answer admits that the employees assembled pursuant to Rogers’s 
directive.73
Third, contrary to the County’s arguments, the record supports the ALJ’s 
conclusion that Rogers told the assembled employees that he wanted them to stop 
making their complaints to COBA about his supervisory directives. Rogers himself 
testified that he made that statement to Sutch. Despite Rogers’s general denials and 
inability to recall his remarks, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Sutch’s recollection 
about what Rogers said to the assembled officers is more reliable than Rogers’s.
Indeed, we find it reasonable to believe that Sutch would remember being called a 
"nitwit” by his commanding officer, and why the characterization was ascribed to the 
group -  that Rogers was angry about employees reporting their complaints regarding 
Rogers’s supervisory directives to the Sheriff through COBA. While Garranger could 
not provide a verbatim recitation of Rogers’s statements on COBA’s direct examination, 
his testimony on the County’s cross examination is sufficiently consistent with Sutch’s 
testimony to corroborate his account of the events.
Rogers’s own testimony supports a conclusion that he resented the complaints. 
Although he testified that he does not mind it when employees’ complaints are based on 
accurate information, he testified that he resents complaints that are based on what he 
considers to be inaccurate information. In that regard, while Rogers denied having said 
to the assembled officers that they should "pick their battles” when complaining to
73 ALJ Ex 2, at 10.
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COBA about their terms and conditions of employment, the County’s answer admitted 
that Rogers made that very statement.74
Fourth, contrary to the County’s arguments, we find no objective record evidence 
that compels our rejection of the ALJ’s finding that Rogers threatened that if the 
employees continued to voice their complaints to COBA about his supervisory directives 
there would be consequences that their fellow employees might not like. The record 
supports the ALJ’s determination that Rogers told the assembled group that if they 
continued to "stir the pot” he would close the Operations Unit on weekends. That the 
ALJ reasonably credited Sutch’s recollection of the event is supported by Sutch’s 
detailed account of the banter in response to Rogers’s threat. While the employees 
questioned the propriety of such a move, Rogers responded that "the Sheriff can do 
whatever he wants.” Similarly, Sutch’s detailed recollection of the events supports our 
conclusion that Rogers told the assembled group that their complaints "piss the Sheriff 
off.” Indeed, Rogers’s testimony about "Vinny’s” response to his statements supports 
the proposition that Rogers’s announcement conveyed a threat of bad things to come if 
the complaints continued; to wit: "I wish I knew who called the Union, I would like to 
straighten that person out.”75 As with Sutch and Garranger, it reasonably appears that 
Vinny understood Rogers’s remarks to convey a threat of actions adverse to the 
interests of unit employees if they continued to file complaints.
74 ALJ Ex 2, at 14.
75 Tr, at p. 124.
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Rogers’s statements to Hilbrandt on April 24, 2013 
Again, no objective evidence has been adduced by the County invalidating the 
ALJ’s decision to credit Hilbrandt’s testimony as to his conversation with Rogers on April 
24, 2013. Rogers directed Hilbrandt to meet with him in the Transportation office.76 
Then, referring to the April 22 agenda for the upcoming labor-management meeting, 
Rogers told Hilbrandt that he had just been "reamed out by the sheriff” because of the 
complaints that had been lodged against him.77 Rogers went on to say that every time 
"you guys” go to the union you put a spotlight on yourselves and that he was thinking 
about moving officers into security on weekends.78 Rogers’s lack of recollection about 
the meeting does not refute Hilbrandt’s testimony.
Conclusions
Initially, contrary to COBA’s arguments, we find that Rogers’s remarks to 
Hilbrandt do not rise to the level of a violation of the Act. Rogers’s statement to a fellow 
supervisor, albeit of a lower rank, that he had been "reamed out” by the Sheriff because 
of the complaints by the rank and file officers appears to us to be the sort of 
conversation that any two supervisors might have regarding the consequences of their 
supervisory actions. Rogers’s statement to Hilbrandt that he was thinking about moving 
people from the Operations Unit to security is also consistent with an exchange 
between supervisors about matters they are considering. Finally, Rogers’s comment to 
Hilbrandt that the rank and file employees’ complaints bring attention to the Operations
76 Tr, at pp. 81-82.
77 Tr, at p. 78.
78 Tr, at p. 84.
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Unit does not strike us as an admonition that Hilbrandt should refrain from making such 
complaints.
Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s determination that Rogers’s statements to 
Hilbrandt constitute a violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act.
As for the events of January 1,2013, the record establishes that shortly after 
Jaronczyk’s Christmas report of Sutch’s complaints to the sheriff about Rogers’s 
directives and the sheriff’s assurance to Jaronczyk that he would take care of them, 
Rogers made the remarks that formed the basis of COBA’s improper practice charge.
Rogers’s remarks were made to rank and file officers during a meeting that he 
called in his capacity as the commanding officer of the Operations Unit. His remarks 
were plainly intended to inhibit the employees from exercising their protected right to 
voice to their union their concerns about his supervisory actions -  a violation of § 209- 
a.1 (a). Moreover, Rogers’s remarks conveyed a threat of adverse employment 
consequences if the employees persisted in complaining about his directives, including 
the possibility that he would close the Operations Unit on weekends if they continued to 
"stir the pot” -  a violation of § 209-a.1 (c).
Contrary to the County’s argument, the fact that Rogers is in the same bargaining 
unit as the rank and file employees does not privilege his remarks that coerce, interfere 
with, or restrain the employees’ protected rights where, as here, his remarks were made 
in his capacity as their commanding officer. In that capacity, Rogers is the person to 
whom rank and file employees look for guidance and direction regarding their 
employer’s expectations as to their proper behavior. Rogers’s statements can be 
reasonably, objectively understood to convey his supervisory antipathy toward their
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protected rights and a desire to inhibit the employees’ from voicing their complaints. 
Therefore, contrary to the County’s arguments, Roger’s inclusion in COBA’s bargaining 
unit does not insulate the County from violations of the Act that Rogers commits in his 
capacity as the commanding officer of the Operations Unit, as, in that capacity, he is a 
representative of the County.
The County’s reliance on Sullivan County79 for a contrary result is without merit. 
That case has no precedential value. The conduct at-issue there—the alleged 
interference with and retaliation for the exercise of rights protected under § 202 of the 
Act -  occurred before PERB had improper practice jurisdiction to prevent it,80 as the 
Hearing Officer noted in the report to the Board.81
To the extent Sullivan County may have any persuasive value, the County’s 
reliance on it here is unavailing. There, a supervisory officer in a bargaining unit of 
corrections officers that included supervisors and rank and file officers engaged in a 
dispute during a union meeting over what negotiations position the union should take 
regarding wages for the supervisory officers. The Board held that the supervisor’s 
hostile remarks toward the rank and file officers for the union’s negotiations position did 
not violate the Act because the supervisor was speaking in his capacity as unit member, 
not as a supervisor.
In the instant matter, Rogers was speaking in his capacity as a supervisor, not as 
a unit member. Indeed, the January 1,2013 meeting was not a union meeting. It was 
convened pursuant to Rogers’s order as commanding officer of the Operations Unit.
79 3 PERB fl 8006, affd, 3 PERB fl 3041 (1970).
80 See CSEA v Helsby, 21 NY2d 541 (1968).
81 Sullivan County, 3 PERB fl 8006, at 8143.
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Next, we reject the County’s argument that it cannot be held liable for Rogers’s 
statements that constitute the alleged violations of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) because there 
is no evidence that it authorized or condoned them. Here again, the County’s reliance 
on Sullivan County is unavailing. There, the Board addressed a second incident 
involving a supervisor where the supervisor’s anger toward another unit member during 
a union meeting escalated to fisticuffs initiated by the supervisor. After the victim 
reported the matter to the sherriff and the local District Attorney, criminal charges were 
filed against the supervisor. Subsequently, the sheriff discharged the victim of the 
attack rather than the supervisor who initiated it. The Board rejected the argument that 
the sheriff retaliated against the victim’s exercise of his protected right to freely 
participate in the union meeting, finding that the sheriff could not be held liable for the 
supervisor’s assault where there was no evidence that the sheriff condoned or 
authorized it. The Board further rejected the notion that the sheriff’s decision to fire the 
victim and not the assailant was improperly motivated, finding that the sherriff’s decision 
was motivated by legitimate business reasons -  greater personal loyalty to the 
supervisor than to the victim.
We agree that an employer cannot be held strictly liable for criminal acts of its 
employees where it did not authorize or condone the actions. However, where the 
conduct is solely a violation of the Act, we apply a more liberal construction of agency 
principals by which the conduct of supervisors may be attributed to an employer.82
82 See City of Schenectady, 26 PERB 3038 (1993).
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Contrary to the County’s argument, the Board’s decision in City of Schenectady83 
does not dictate the result the County seeks. There, a supervisor (a police captain) 
granted a benefit to a rank and file officer in the same unit that was in excess of the 
benefit to which the officer was entitled—a flexible work schedule other than the fixed 
schedule that had been posted for the position. Normally, the grant of a benefit in 
excess of that to which a represented employee is entitled violates § 209-a.1 (a) of the 
Act because it is inherently destructive of a union's representational rights and sends 
the message to employees that they can fare better without union representation.83 4 In 
Schenectady, however, the Board found no violation. It reasoned that the work 
schedule had been secretly arranged between the supervisor and the rank and file 
officer and was contrary to express instructions given to the supervisor by the Police 
Commissioner that the posted shift could not be changed. Under those circumstances, 
the Board declined to attribute responsibility for the supervisor’s clandestine prohibited 
conduct to the employer.85 86
Likewise, in City School District of the City of Buffalo,86 we found that the 
remarks of an elected school board member that were hostile toward the exercise of 
protected rights were not attributable to the district or the full board of education on 
agency principals. Not only were the remarks inconsistent with the district’s current 
positions and interests, but they were immediately renounced by the president of the
83Id.
84 Connetquot Cent Sch Dist, 19 PERB fl 3045 (1986).
85 Notably, the Board observed that there was no evidence that the City ratified or 
adopted the supervisor’s grant of the more advantageous schedule. Indeed, the 
decision does not indicate what happened to the supervisor for his disobedience or 
whether the officer’s schedule was adjusted to the posted schedule.
86 48 PERB fl 3001 (2015).
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board of education in a communication to all who received the hostile message. There, 
however, we observed:
While we find that there must be some agency relationship 
between an individual board member and a board of 
education to impute the member's statement to the Board, 
the authorization need not be explicit . . . . For example, a 
board member may act with apparent or implied authority 
without express authorization of the full board of education.87
Here, in contrast to the circumstances in Schenectady and Buffalo Board of 
Education, Rogers’s statements were not clandestine, expressly prohibited, or 
immediately renounced. Indeed, they were made to an assembly of rank and file 
employees in his capacity as the commanding officer of the Operations Unit. The 
statements were plainly intended to inhibit the employees from exercising their 
protected efforts to voice their complaints to COBA about his supervisory directives in 
violation of § 209-a.1 (a) of the Act. We find that, in context, Rogers, as commanding 
officer for the Operations Unit, was acting as an agent of the County cognizable under § 
209-a.1 of the Act.
Indeed, the violation of § 209-a.1 (a) is established here, irrespective of whether 
higher level officials of the County expressly authorized or condoned the coercive 
statements. As the ALJ correctly observed, under the County’s theory, supervisors 
could, with impunity, engage in campaigns designed to prevent employees from 
exercising their protected rights absent evidence that the “employer” (whoever that may 
be) authorized the unlawful behavior. The County’s theory defies reason and the
87 Id., at 3005. There we offered a precautionary admonition: “[A] board of education 
may violate the Act when a single member, although not expressly authorized by the 
board, credibly threatens to do everything in her power to terminate employees who 
exercise protected rights under the Act, if the board fails to issue a prompt, equally 
credible, repudiation of such threats.”
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policies underlying the Legislature’s grant of protected rights to public employees. 
Notably, an employer’s authorization for supervisors to engage in activity that violates 
the Act would, itself, be unlawful.
We also reject the County’s argument that Rogers’s threats cannot violate § 209- 
a.1 (c) of the Act because he had no actual authority to implement employment related 
decisions. Indeed, the employees’ protected complaints to COBA and COBA’s pursuit 
of those complaints with the sheriff concerned Rogers’s employment related directives. 
Although the County emphasizes that Rogers’s supervisory authority does not extend to 
transfers of employees or shift assignments, he testified that he can make effective 
recommendations to the sherriff where such authority lies.88 We find, therefore, that 
Rogers had apparent authority to actually influence, if not accomplish, his employment 
related retaliatory supervisory objectives.
Moreover, contrary to the County’s arguments, we find that the employees had 
no reason to question the credibility of Rogers’s threat that he would close the 
Operations Unit on weekends if they continued to "stir the pot.” When challenging his 
threat, the employees questioned the wisdom of the closure, not Rogers’s authority to 
implement it, supporting our view that the employees perceived no reason to doubt his 
authority. Moreover, in response to the employees’ challenge, Rogers declared that the 
sherriff (who was also "pissed off” by the complaints) can do whatever he wants. When 
read in context, we find that the employees reasonably understood that Rogers’s threat 
to close the Operations Unit on weekends if they continued to file complaints about his 
supervisory directives was a credible threat.
88 Tr, at pp. 147-149.
Case No. U-32687 22
Accordingly, we reject the County’s argument that Rogers’s threats cannot 
violate § 209-a.1 (c) of the Act because he had no actual authority to influence, much 
less implement, any employment related decisions. He had actual supervisory 
authority, and authority to make effective recommendations to the Sheriff to advance his 
objectives.89 From the employees’ perspective, he had, minimally, apparent authority to 
implement his threats.
By reason of the foregoing, we find that Rogers’s remarks to rank and file 
employees in his capacity as their commanding officer were intended to coerce, restrain 
and interfere with the rank and file employees protected rights to voice their complaints 
to their union regarding Rogers’s employment related supervisory actions and COBA’s 
protected right to pursue those complaints with the Sherriff. Therefore, we find that the 
County violated § 209-a.1 (a) of the Act. We further find that Rogers’s remarks 
conveyed a threat of retaliation for the employees’ exercise of their protected rights and, 
therefore, that the County violated § 209-a.1 (c) of the Act. Accordingly, we affirm the 
ALJ’s determination in those respects.
We find, however, that Rogers’s remarks to Hilbrandt on April 24, 2013, do not 
rise to the level of a violation of the Act. We reverse the ALJ’s decision in that regard. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the County of Nassau shall:
89 The County’s reliance on County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Sherriff, 25 PERB ^ 
4670 (1992) is misplaced. There, an ALJ held that there was no evidence that a 
supervisor’s hostility toward the assignment of certain duties to unit corrections officers 
precipitated the transfer of the work to nonunit personnel where the supervisor was not 
responsible for the transfer. In any event, a decision of an ALJ is not binding on the 
Board and has no precedential value.
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1. Cease and desist from retaliating against and interfering with unit members 
for their engagement in protected activity, to wit: making reports of workplace concerns 
to COBA and/or enlisting COBA’s assistance and representation;
2. Cease and desist from threatening unit members for their engagement in 
protected activity, to wit: making reports of workplace concerns to COBA and/or 
enlisting COBA’s assistance and representation;
3. Cease and desist from questioning unit members regarding their 
communications with COBA concerning representation relating to workplace concerns; 
and
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees.
DATED: November 10, 2015
Albany, New York
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify the employees represented by the Nassau County Sheriff’s 
Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. that the County of Nassau will:
1. Not retaliate against unit members for their engagement in protected activity, 
to wit: making reports of workplace concerns to COBA and/or enlisting 
COBA’s assistance and representation;
2. Not threaten unit members for their engagement in protected activity, to wit: 
making reports of workplace concerns to COBA and/or enlisting COBA’s 
assistance and representation; and
3. Not question unit members regarding their communications with COBA 
concerning representation relating to workplace concerns.
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
County of Nassau
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, 
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
RICHARD S. TROWBRIDGE,
Charging Party,
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
- and -
VILLAGE OF GREENPORT,
Respondent,
Employer.
CASE NO. U-32822
RICHARD S. TROWBRIDGE, p ro  se
STEVEN A. CRAIN, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Respondent
LAMB AND BARNOSKY, LLP (ALYSON MATHEWS of counsel), for 
Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to the Board on exceptions to an Administrative Law Judge’s 
(ALJ) decision1 dismissing Richard S. Trowbridge’s amended improper practice charge 
alleging a violation of § 209-a.2 (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000 (CSEA) when it failed to 
respond to his letters asking it to assist him in obtaining benefits from the Village of 1
1 47 PERB 4597 (2014).
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Greenport (Village).2
Trowbridge had also alleged in his charge and amended charge that the Village 
violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. The Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director), by notice dated August 27, 2013, determined those 
charges were deficient for lack of standing, as untimely and that the activity alleged 
therein to have motivated retaliation against Trowbridge did not constitute protected 
activity.3 The ALJ also found that those same charges were deficient and the mere fact 
that the Village was included in the charge and amended charge as a necessary party 
pursuant to § 209-a.3 of the Act did not, in and of itself, raise any claims against it.
EXCEPTIONS
Trowbridge alleges in his exception that after his charge was assigned to an ALJ 
for a conference (which took place on October 30, 2013), "the issues that were 
addressed in my complaint were not clarified, limited or resolved at that conference, as 
is required by PERB’s rules. No hearing date or ALJ was assigned to the matter and 
contrary to the written rules, [the ALJ] accepted a motion to dismiss the matter and has
2 Trowbridge amended his original charge in response to a finding by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation dated June 21, 20l3 that the charge 
was technically deficient with respect to claims against the Village. He attempted to 
address those claims in his amended charge.
3 Rules of Procedure of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(Rules), § 204.2; Letter dated August 27, 2013 ("Notice of Conference”), Director to 
Trowbridge and counsel for CSEA and the Village. Trowbridge never filed exceptions to 
the Director’s August 27, 2013 determination nor would exceptions now be timely; 
neither does he challenge the ALJ’s findings on this issue. The outstanding charges 
before the Board are exceptions arising out of charges against CSEA.
Case No. U-32822 -3-
ruled to dismiss the matter.”4
In particular, he relies upon the Board’s website (a portion of which is labeled
"Frequently Asked Questions about Improper Practices”, commonly referred to as
"FAQs”) which, at the time, stated:
Q: How is the case processed after the initial review by the 
Director?
A: The charge is assigned to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) to conduct a conference for the purpose of clarifying, 
limiting and resolving the issues. If the charge is not 
resolved at the conference, the matter is reassigned to a 
different ALJ for the issuance of the decision. That ALJ may 
either conduct a hearing or decide the matter on a stipulated 
record.5
Trowbridge alleges that the ALJ had no "jurisdiction” to decide the matter without 
holding an evidentiary hearing; indeed, the ultimate question, he argues, should have 
been decided by another ALJ. In addition, he alleges that "the timeliness of the charge 
has not been revealed and, since it has not been raised and revealed at a hearing, it 
cannot be considered by the ALJ and should be considered waived.”6
CSEA and the Village filed responses to the exceptions.
Upon review of the record and the papers filed herein, we affirm the ALJ’s 
decision.
FACTS
The ALJ found the following based upon the allegations in Trowbridge’s charge
4 Exceptions, contained in letter dated November 26, 2014.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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and amended charge, and the facts set forth in Trowbridge's offer of proof. These facts, 
including the chronology of events, are uncontested by the parties.
CSEA represents a unit comprised of "all persons holding a position by 
appointment or employment in the Village . . . , except elected officials and supervisory 
personnel of the Village.”7 The last collective bargaining agreement negotiated between 
the Village and CSEA had a term of June 1,2006 to May 31,2010 (Agreement).
Trowbridge worked for the Village from September 2008 to September 2011. His 
duties were to record and transcribe the meetings and/or hearings of the Village's Board 
of Trustees, Planning Board, Zoning Board of Appeals and Historic Preservation 
Commission and of other Village meetings as required.8
During this time, the Village alleges that it treated Trowbridge as an independent 
contractor; it did not withhold taxes from his pay or pay any taxes on his income and it 
reported his income to the taxing authorities as if he were an independent contractor. In 
addition, the Village did not pay Trowbridge according to the Agreement or otherwise 
accord him any benefits or rights contained therein.9
On or about September 16, 2011, after the Village terminated his services,10 
Trowbridge filed for unemployment insurance benefits with the New York State 78910
7 Charge, Ex 1.
8 Charge, Ex 10.
9 Id.
10 Charge, Ex 4 (in which the Village stated that it was "exploring various options for the 
recording and transcription of public meetings, to best serve the constituency”) the 
receipt of which is acknowledged by Trowbridge. Indeed, Trowbridge had been advised 
as early as August 23, 2011 that the Village no longer needed his services (Charge, Ex 
2). He had also received communications as late as September 21, 2011 (Charge, Ex 
6) in which the Village asked him to return its recording equipment.
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Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Division (UID). The Village opposed 
his application for unemployment benefits, arguing that he was an independent 
contractor and, therefore, not entitled to benefits. The UID issued an initial 
determination dated November 18, 2011, finding that Trowbridge was eligible to receive 
benefits.11 The Village appealed that determination. After a hearing, the UID issued an 
award dated March 22, 2013, in which it rejected the Village's argument that Trowbridge 
was an independent contractor and found that he was an employee for purposes of the 
Unemployment Insurance Law and entitled to receive benefits thereunder.1 2
After he received the March 22, 2013 UID award, Trowbridge sent a letter dated 
May 3, 2013, to the Village's Mayor advising him that the UID had issued a decision 
determining that he had been a Village employee.13 He asked that the Village treat him 
as a Village employee entitled to the benefits of the Agreement. In particular, he 
asserted that he should have been paid at the contractual overtime rate for work he 
performed on Saturdays and for hours in excess of thirty-five hours a week, and he 
demanded that the Village compensate him for the three years he worked for it the 
difference between the salary he received and the overtime rate it should have paid 
him.
The Village Clerk responded to Trowbridge's letter with a letter dated May 30, 
2013, denying his request and stating that, since he was not a member of the CSEA
11 Charge, Ex 9.
12 Charge, Ex 10.
13 Charge, Ex 11; Offer of Proof, at p. 5.
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unit during his employment, the Agreement's overtime provisions did not apply to him.14
It was not until May 23, 2013, that Trowbridge wrote a letter to CSEA unit 
president Nick LaMorte forwarding a copy of his May 3, 2013 letter to the Mayor, 
asserting that the UID had issued a decision that found that during his employment, the 
Village had misclassified him as an independent contractor and seeking CSEA's 
assistance in obtaining benefits he believed he should have received under the 
Agreement.15 It is undisputed that before sending his May 23, 2013 letter, Trowbridge 
had not asked CSEA to represent him in any manner or sought its assistance. When 
CSEA did not respond to his May 23, 2013 letter, Trowbridge sent LaMorte a further 
letter dated June 10, 2013 that included a copy of his prior letter and asked LaMorte 
whether CSEA intended to assist him with his complaint with the Village.16
By letter dated September 12, 2013, CSEA's attorney responded to Trowbridge's
May 23 and June 10, 2013 letters, in relevant part, as follows:
You were not considered an employee by the Village, CSEA, 
or yourself for that matter, during the time period you 
provided services to the Village as a contract stenographer.
Neither did you tender or seek to tender dues to CSEA, nor 
did you sign a dues authorization card or seek membership 
in CSEA. Moreover, by the time your letters were received 
by Mr. LaMorte, any action by CSEA on your behalf, had you 
been a member, would have been untimely. In addition, the 
determination by the DOL that you are entitled to 
unemployment insurance benefits does not mean you are 
considered an employee for all purposes. That determination 
is limited in scope to your entitlement, if any, to
14 Charge, Ex 12; Offer of Proof, at p. 5.
15 Charge, Ex 13; Offer of Proof, at pp. 5-6.
16 Charge, Ex 14.
Case No. U-32822 -7-
unemployment insurance benefits.17
On June 18, 2013, Trowbridge filed the instant improper practice charge against 
CSEA which responded by filing an answer denying the material allegations of the 
charge and raising the defenses of timeliness and that Trowbridge was never a unit 
employee or an employee of the Village.18 The Village, a statutory party pursuant to § 
209-a.3 of the Act, filed an answer denying the charge’s material allegations.
The ALJ held a conference on October 30, 2013, and by letter of the same date 
confirmed that the parties had agreed that certain facts were undisputed. Those facts 
were slightly modified June 25, 2014 based upon a letter the ALJ received from 
Trowbridge.19
In her letter, the ALJ stated that the only timely allegations raised in the charge 
against CSEA were that it failed to respond to Trowbridge’s requests made in his May 
23 and June 10, 2013 letters.20 Trowbridge was given an opportunity to submit an offer 
of proof if he believed that the charge raised any other timely allegations under the Act. 
He filed such an offer sworn to November 19, 2013. CSEA and the Village filed 
responses.
By letter dated December 18, 2013, the ALJ confirmed her prior ruling regarding
17 Offer of Proof, Ex B.
18 CSEA’s Verified Answer, "First Defense” (averred that the "improper practice charge 
must be dismissed as untimely and beyond the applicable statute of limitations”), and 
"Second Defense” through "Fifth Defense” (separately and collectively addressed issues 
of whether Trowbridge was an employee and member of the CSEA unit).
19 The ALJ noted that she mistakenly referred to a May 27, 2013 letter from Trowbridge 
to CSEA when in fact the correct date for such letter was May 23, 2013.
20 Trowbridge’s charge was filed June 18, 2013, within four months of both requests.
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the limits of the charge and gave CSEA and the Village an opportunity to file motions to 
dismiss the charge (by January 30, 2014) and Trowbridge an opportunity to respond to 
any such motion (by March 3, 2014).
Trowbridge, in a letter dated February 10, 2014, alleged that the ALJ who 
conferenced the matter could not also decide the ultimate question raised by the 
charges.21 The Director, by letter dated February 27, 2014, responded that "[t]he 
bifurcated procedure to which you refer in your letter was ended for those cases 
processed in the Brooklyn office [as this one was] as of late 2012. It has more presently 
ended as the cases processed out of our Albany and Buffalo offices as well.”22
Subsequently, CSEA filed a motion to dismiss the charge, alleging among other 
things, that the charge was untimely and, in any event, Trowbridge lacked standing. By 
letter dated June 23, 2014, the ALJ advised Trowbridge that she had not received a 
response from him to CSEA's motion, extended his time to respond to that motion and 
stated that if he did not file a response by a date certain, she would rely upon the 
arguments he made in his offer of proof. Trowbridge never responded to CSEA's 
motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
The crux of the exceptions filed by Trowbridge challenge the propriety of a single 
ALJ both conferencing and making the ultimate decision on a matter rather than the
21 Letter of Trowbridge to Director, February 10, 2014.
22 Exceptions, Ex 2, Letter of Director to Trowbridge, February 27, 2014. The procedure 
referred to was never a part of the formal rules and operating procedures of the Board.
It was a practice that was discontinued months prior to the processing of the instant 
charge.
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substance of the ALJ’s decision. We find that there has never been a statutory or 
regulatory mandate that the Board assign two administrative law judges to a single 
matter, or that the Board is precluded from assigning a single administrative judge to 
conference and ultimately preside over a charge before rendering a final 
determination.23 Trowbridge recites no rule or law to the contrary because there is no 
such rule or law; he only recites the response to an online FAQ provided for 
informational purposes only. The Rules only require (now and as of the time 
Trowbridge filed his charge and amended charge) that “[pjrior to the scheduled date of 
any hearing, the designated administrative law judge shall hold a conference with the 
parties to the proceeding.”24
As the Director made clear in his correspondence dated February 27, 2014, the 
FAQs, as they appeared on the website, simply had not been edited to conform to 
existing practice which had eliminated the "second ALJ” as part of the processing of a 
charge. Indeed, using a single ALJ for conferencing and adjudicating a matter was the 
Board’s practice at that time and was the practice as far back as 2012. As the FAQs 
and the Rules appeared together on the same website (and the Board is vested with 
sole authority to determine procedures for adjudicating matters before it), Trowbridge 
was on notice. There was nothing arbitrary and capricious in the Board’s or the 
Director’s actions nor in any action taken by following this established practice. Nor has 
Trowbridge identified any prejudice to him arising from the change in practice.
23 Section 205.5 (1) of the Act vests the Board with sole authority to make rules and set 
procedures.
24 Rules, § 212.2.
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As a result of the conference, the ALJ elucidated the facts and clarified 
arguments. Trowbridge had an opportunity to present facts relevant to his charge and 
address the Village and CSEA’s arguments. As a result of the conference he did submit 
an "offer of proof” that clarified the relevant dates and chronology upon which the 
decision by the ALJ ultimately rested.
Contrary to Trowbridge’s expectations, neither the Act nor the Rules mandates 
an evidentiary hearing.25 The Rules also vest authority with the Director to assign an 
ALJ or substitute an ALJ:
A formal hearing for the purpose of taking evidence relevant 
to the proceeding before the agency shall be conducted as 
necessary by the administrative law judge designated by the 
director. At any time, an administrative law judge may be 
substituted by the director for the administrative law judge 
previously assigned.26
Trowbridge’s claim that the ALJ had no "jurisdiction” or authority to dismiss the 
charge on the basis of it being untimely is therefore wholly without merit. He 
misconstrues Rule § 212.4 (l)27 which governs the situation in which the facts as 
developed in the course of a hearing form the foundation for a challenge that a charge 
is untimely where that challenge has not otherwise been pleaded by the parties. The 
Rule ensures that parties, who must address such a claim, can effectively respond to
25 State of New York (Manhattan Developmental Center), 22 PERB ^ 3049, 3114, n. 5 
(1989).
26 Rules, § 212.4 (a).
27 Rules, § 212.4 (l) provides: "A motion may be made to dismiss an improper practice 
charge, or the administrative law judge may dismiss a charge, on the ground that the 
alleged violation occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the charge, but 
only if the failure of timeliness was first revealed during the hearing. An objection to the 
timeliness of the charge, if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived.”
Case No. U-32822 -11-
the challenge.28
In the matter before us, CSEA effectively and clearly pleaded untimeliness as a 
defense in its answer. Trowbridge was placed on notice that CSEA was raising that 
defense and the ALJ properly addressed it. Thus, there is no legal foundation to 
reverse the ALJ’s finding based on Trowbridge’s exception that "[s]ince there has been 
no hearing, the timeliness of the charge has not been revealed and, since it has not 
been raised and revealed at a hearing, it cannot be considered by the ALJ and should 
be considered waived.”29
Were we to go beyond Trowbridge’s narrow exceptions, we would be constrained 
to find that the record does not support the gravamen of Trowbridge’s claim -  that is to 
say, that CSEA breached its duty of fair representation.30
To demonstrate a breach of the duty of fair representation, a charging party must 
prove that an employee organization acted in a manner that was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith.31 Under the Act, an employee organization is afforded a 
broad range of reasonable discretion in determining which grievances to pursue and to 
what level of the negotiated grievance procedure.32 A mere disagreement with the
28 See City Sch Dist of City of New Rochelle, 34 PERB fl 3028 (2001).
29 Exceptions, contained in letter dated November 26, 2014.
30 We do not need to address the issue of whether the matter was timely filed or 
whether Trowbridge had standing to file the instant matter.
31 Nassau Community Coll Fed of Teachers, L 3150 (Staskowski), 42 PERB fl 3007 
(2009).
32 See Rochester Teachers Assn (Falso), 45 PERB fl 3033 (2012); District Council 37 
(Blowe and Watson), 42 PERB fl 3008 (2009); Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 
PERB fl3003 (2008). See also Symanski v East Ramapo Cent Sch Dist, 117 AD2d 18, 
19 PERB fl 7516 (2d Dept 1986).
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contract interpretation or tactics of an employee organization is insufficient to 
demonstrate a breach of the duty of fair representation.33 We will not substitute our 
judgment concerning the merits of a grievance for an employee organization's 
reasonable interpretation of its negotiated agreement with the employer.34 Finally, an 
employee organization is not obligated to pursue a claim it believes, in good faith, to 
lack merit.35
On a motion to dismiss, an ALJ must "assume the truth of all of charging party's 
evidence and give the charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could 
be drawn from those assumed facts.”36 We must give all reasonable inferences to the 
content of the pleadings and offer of proof and determine if such facts as may be 
derived from that exercise demonstrate the existence of a cognizable claim.37
Even if the record before the ALJ established that Trowbridge’s claims were 
timely and that CSEA owed him a duty of fair representation, the record, including 
Trowbridge’s comprehensive offer of proof, is void of any facts or evidence that CSEA 
breached such duty.
In determining whether a breach has been established, we are constrained in our
33 Amalgamated Transit Union, L1056 (Lefevre), 43 PERB fl 3027 (2010); TWU 
(Brockington), 37 PERB fl 3002 (2004).
34 UFT (Morrell), 44 PERB fl 3030 (2011).
35 Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Gardner), 31 PERB 
fl 3076 (1998).
36 See Rochester Teachers Assn (Falso), 45 PERB fl 3033, 3078 (2012); County of 
Livingston, 43 PERB fl 3018 (2010); Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New 
York (Grassel), 43 PERB fl 3010 (2010); Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 
PERB fl 3020 (2009).
37 County of Rockland (CSEA), 45 PERB fl 3028, 3065 (2012).
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analysis by the fact that the courts have:
rejected the standard that "irresponsible or grossly negligent” 
conduct may form the basis for a union’s breach of the duty 
of fair representation as not within the meaning of improper 
employee organization practices set forth in Civil Service 
Law § 209-a. An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union. 38
In this matter, it is indisputable that CSEA first learned of Trowbridge’s concern 
in his May 23, 2013 letter. Before that time, Trowbridge had not asked CSEA to 
represent him in any manner or even sought its assistance.
By letter to Trowbridge dated September 12, 2013, CSEA's attorney proffered the 
reason for its actions:
You were not considered an employee by the Village, CSEA, 
or yourself for that matter, during the time period you 
provided services to the Village as a contract stenographer.
Neither did you tender or seek to tender dues to CSEA, nor 
did you sign a dues authorization card or seek membership 
in CSEA. Moreover, by the time your letters were received 
by Mr. LaMorte, any action by CSEA on your behalf, had you 
been a member, would have been untimely. In addition, the 
determination by the DOL that you are entitled to 
unemployment insurance benefits does not mean you are 
considered an employee for all purposes. That determination 
is limited in scope to your entitlement, if any, to 
unemployment insurance benefits.
38 Id., at 3033-3034 (quoting UFT (Monroe), 47 PERB fl 3031,3095 (2014), confd sub 
nom. Munroe v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 48 PERB fl 7002 (Sup Ct NY Co 2015) 
(editing marks omitted)); Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 Pe Rb fl 3008, 3026 (2014); 
see Civ Serv Empl Assn, L 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 
432, 20 PERB fl 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 
PERB fl 7017 (1988)).
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There is simply no evidence and no facts to indicate that this reasoned response,
whether ultimately correct on the merits or not, was a pretext for more invidious
reasons. Even if CSEA erred on Trowbridge’s employment status, there is no proof
whatsoever that CSEA was acting arbitrarily, in bad faith or discriminatorily.
Based upon the foregoing, we dismiss the charge in its entirety.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is affirmed, and the
charge is dismissed.
DATED: November 10, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
RANDOLPH JONES,
- and -
Charging Party,
CASE NOS. U-32847 
U-33264
LOCAL 158, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
OPERATING ENGINEERS,
-and-
Respondent,
ONONDAGA COUNTY RESOURCE 
RECOVERY AGENCY,
Employer.
RANDOPH JONES, pro se
FREDERICK K. REICH, ESQ., for Respondent
WILLIAM J. BULSIEWICZ, ESQ., for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
These cases come to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing the improper practice charges, as amended, filed by Randolph 
Jones alleging violations of §§ 209-a.2 (a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act).1 Jones’ charges were predicated on his claims that his union, 
Local 156, International Union of Operating Engineers (Union), had breached its duty of 
fair representation by (1) failing to pursue a grievance in May 2013; (2) mishandling 
another grievance filed in June 2013 and then declining to pursue that grievance to 
arbitration; and (3) failing to pursue a grievance dated July 12, 2013 to the subsequent 
steps in the parties’ grievance procedure.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the determination of the ALJ. 1
1 48 PERB H 4517 (2015).
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EXCEPTIONS
Jones excepts to the ALJ’s decision on several grounds. First, he contends that 
the ALJ erred in that "she did not set forth any affirmative defense for the Respondent or 
the Employer, for which she could base her decision on.”2 Second, Jones claims that 
the ALJ wrongly stated that the Union was waiting for a federal judge to rule on a matter 
involving a side letter between the parties. Jones’s third exception asserts that the ALJ 
erred in allowing the Union to submit a "Memorandum” instead of a brief, as required 
pursuant to Rule 212 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). In his fourth and sixth 
exceptions, Jones claims that the ALJ incorrectly quoted Article 22b of the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement in place from 2011 through 2014 (Agreement), and 
failed to base her decision on the binding language of the Agreement. In his fifth, 
eighth, and ninth exceptions, Jones contends that the ALJ erred by treating a side letter 
as part of the Agreement, by basing her decision on the side letter, and by not 
addressing "the issue of the Side Letter, which the Respondent and the Employer say 
was part of the [Agreement] as page 54.”3 Finally, Jones claims, the ALJ erred in not 
addressing the anti-discrimination provision of the Agreement.
As relief, Jones asks the Board to reverse the ALJ’s decision, award him make 
whole relief, and order the Union and the Onondaga County Resource Recovery 
Association (OCRRA) to "refrain from stating that the side letter is part of the 
Agreement,” and to "take down the side letter which is posted in the workplace.”4
FACTS
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the ALJ, and are only set forth here to 
the extent necessary to resolve the exceptions. Jones, who is employed by OCRRA in
2 Exceptions at 1.
3 Id., at 2.
4 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 16.
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the title Motorized Equipment Operator (MEO) III and a member of the bargaining unit 
represented by the Union, alleges that the Union failed to pursue several grievances he 
had filed. These grievances alleged that OCRRA had violated the relevant provisions of 
the Agreement pursuant to which unit members would be selected to temporarily act as 
plant operators, another title within the bargaining unit represented by the Union.
Section 20.2 of Article 20 of the Agreement governs the filling of "Temporary Job 
Openings,” that is, "jobs that periodically develop or vacancies that periodically develop 
because of sickness, vacation or leave of absences.”5 Whenever such temporary 
vacancies occur:
OCRRA may fill these positions by assignment, or 
reassignment and such assignments or reassignments shall 
be made on the basis of seniority and qualification. The 
temporary assignment will be offered, in descending order of 
seniority, to qualified employees at the worksite where the 
temporary vacancy exists. If the offer of the temporary 
assignment is not accepted by any qualified employee,
OCCRRA will assign the least senior qualified employee at 
the worksite to fill the temporary vacancy or opening.6
Any employee "assigned to a temporary job opening or filling a vacancy in a higher
qualification, shall be paid the wage rate established for that job,” but, if assigned to a
job for a lower classification will be paid "his/her on wage rate” or that of the job,
"whichever is higher.”7
In September 2012, the Union entered into a "Side Letter Agreement” which 
described itself as "a side letter to the 2011/2014 Agreement between OCRRA and [the 
Union],” (Side Letter) which "details an agreement regarding the implementation of the 
training program, page 54, signed by [representatives of the parties] April 12, 2012.”8
5 ALJ Ex 1B, DD; Agreement § 20.2 (A).
6 Id., § 20.2 (B).
7 Id., § 20.2 (C).
8 Charging Party’s Ex 2.
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This program involves the review of operating manuals as well as mentored and on-the- 
job (OJT) training, which can occur while temporarily assigned to a higher level position 
such as plant operator.
In particular, the side letter addresses the order of training:
Seniority will play the main role—BUT NOT ALWAYS.
Availability of equipment, work demands, skill of person 
involved, absenteeism, OT [overtime] costs, etc., will also be 
decision criteria. The Union . . . shall be made aware[].
Management will first consider those SENIOR with sufficient 
knowledge to be entitled or asked to move into a higher slot 
when needed and they should be trained first. This is an 
irrefutable management decision. When management 
decides not to use the senior man they shall disclose the 
reason to the employee and steward at interest. As we will 
have much training to perform, the positions and/or 
equipment will first be decided on Management 
requirements for maximum flexibility.9
Jones’ charges involve similar grievances alleging that OCRRA’s appointment of 
another employee, Ron Boardway, rather than Jones, as temporary plant operator 
violated Articles 20 and 28 of the Agreement. In his first charge, Jones claims that 
Local 158 either refused to file Jones’s grievances or refused to proceed with his 
grievances beyond step three of the procedure. The ALJ found, and Jones has not 
excepted to such finding, that his testimony did not provide any factual basis for his 
claim that Local 158 breached its duty of fair representation other than the fact that 
Local 158 did not file or proceed on the grievances. The ALJ found that "Jones did 
testify that Local 158 officers and employees consistently told him that, based on the 
September 28, 2012 side letter, the grievances were without merit.”10
Jones’ second charge concerns Local 158’s failure to process a December 28, 
2014 grievance, purportedly on the ground that it was waiting for a decision in Jones’
9 Id., at (B) (capitalization and emphasis in original).
10 48 PERB 4517, at 4568.
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discrimination suit against the County; statements made by Local 158 officers or 
employees refusing to investigate, file, or process discrimination grievances against the 
County; and Local 158’s refusal to put its position in writing to Jones.
The ALJ, consolidating these cases, dismissed the charges, on the ground that 
Jones had failed to prove his claims that the Union breached the duty of fair 
representation.11
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, Jones does not except to the partial dismissal of his 
claims on the basis that some of the acts and omissions alleged fell outside of the 
applicable limitations period. Accordingly, any such claims are not before us.1 2
We can dispose of Jones’ procedural exceptions expeditiously. Jones’ exception 
number 3, complaining that the ALJ allowed the Union to file a "Memorandum” instead 
of a "brief” in violation of § 212 of our Rules, is based on an understandable 
misapprehension on the part of a pro se litigant. The terms "memorandum of law” and 
"brief” are used interchangeably in practice before PERB, and, indeed, before the trial 
level courts.13 In sum, even without addressing the ALJ’s discretion to control the 
proceedings before her, no violation of Rule 212 has been alleged, and no error has
11 Id.
12 City of Lockport, 47 PERB fl 3030, 3093, at n. 8 (2014), quoting Village of Endicott,
47 PERB fl3017, at 3052, at n. 5 (2014) (citing § 213.2 (b) (4) PERB Rules of 
Procedure; City of Schenectady, 46 PERB fl 3025, at 3056, at n. 8 (2013), confirmed 
sub nom Matter of City of Schenectady v n Ys Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 PERB fl 7004 
(Sup Ct Albany Co 2014); Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB fl 3008 (2007), confirmed sub 
nom. Matter of Town of Orangetown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 40 Pe RB fl 7008 
(Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); Town of Walkill, 42 PERB fl 3006 (2009)).
13 See, for example, City of Albany, 7 PERB fl 3078, 3133 (1974) ("the parties were 
requested to mail memoranda of law to us by December 6, 1974. Local 2841's brief was 
received on December 9, 1974 and the City's brief was received the following day.”); 
see also Beardsley v Ferris, 40 Misc.3d 1236(A), 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 51445(U) (Sup Ct 
Oswego Co Sept 3, 2013); Tripp & Co., Inc. v Bank of NY, 28 Misc.3d 1211(A), 2010 
N.Y. Slip Op. 51274(U) (Sup Ct NY Co July 14, 2010) ("a statement of the relevant law 
and arguments belongs in a brief (i.e., a memorandum of law)”).
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been established.
Likewise, Exceptions 1, 2 and 4 lack merit. The ALJ did not base her decision on 
any affirmative defense raised by the Union or OCRRA, or on any delay in action 
caused by waiting for the issuance of a federal court decision, or indeed any impact of 
such decision, but on Jones’s failure to prove the elements of his charge, as to which he 
had the burden of proof. Moreover, Jones’s reliance on the presumption of the truth 
afforded a charging party’s allegations before a hearing does not avail here. As the 
Board has consistently held, and we again affirm, “[tjhat presumption of truth does not 
apply at a hearing, at which, to establish a breach of the duty of fair 
representation under the Act, a charging party has the burden of proof to demonstrate 
that an employee organization’s conduct or actions are arbitrary, discriminatory or 
founded in bad faith.”14
As we recently pointed out, the courts have:
reject[ed] the standard . . . that "irresponsible or grossly 
negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union' s breach 
of the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of 
improper employee organization practices set forth in Civil 
Service Law § 209-a. An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union.15
Here, the crux of the claimed breach of the duty of fair representation is that the 
Union declined to advance Jones’s various grievances on the basis that the grievances
14 UFT (Cruz), 48 PERB fl 3004, 3010, petition denied, Cruz v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 48 PERB fl 7003 (2015) (internal quotation and editing marks omitted), quoting 
UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB fl 3031, 3095 (2014), petition denied, 48 PERB fl 7002 (Sup Ct 
NY Co 2015) (quoting CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB fl 3027, 3082-3083 (2014)); see 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB fl 3027, 3119 (2008).
15 Id., quoting Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB fl 3008, 3026 (2014)
(quoting CSEA, L 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB fl 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl 
7017 (1988)).
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lacked merit in view of the terms of the Side Letter. Jones has argued, absent any 
authority or reasoned grounds, that the Side Letter could not properly be treated as part 
of the Agreement.16 Side agreements are routinely used to amend collective bargaining 
agreements, and a union may limit its representation in accordance with the terms of a 
side agreement.17
In District Council 37 (Farrey), the Board rejected a claim that the terms of a 
side letter, along with the union’s failure to present the side letter for ratification, 
established a breach of the duty of fair representation, as the evidence established that 
the union was "not improperly motivated” in entering into, and abiding by the 
agreement.18 No such showing of improper motivation has been attempted, let alone 
established, here, and thus Jones has not established any basis for his claim that the 
Union breached its duty of fair representation by entering into the Side Letter.19
Nor has Jones demonstrated that the Union’s refusals to pursue his grievances 
on the ground that they were precluded by the Side Letter were arbitrary, discriminatory 
or founded in bad faith. As we have recently reaffirmed, "[i]t is well-settled that an 
employee organization is entitled to a wide range of reasonable discretion in the
16 We note, however, that contrary to Jones’ exceptions numbers 8 and 9, the actual 
terms of the Side Letter do not purport to constitute page 54 of the Agreement; rather 
the Side Letter states that it "details an agreement regarding the implementation of the 
training program, page 54.” That is, the Side Letter refers to a separate document, 
agreed upon between the parties, which it implements by supplementing the 
Agreement. To the extent these exceptions are predicated on the misreading of the 
Side Letter, they are dismissed.
17 District Council 37 (Farrey), 41 PERB ^ 3027, at 3120 (dismissing claimed breach of 
the duty of fair representation based on side letter in which union agreed to not raise 
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act against employer); NYC Transit Auth v NYS 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 232 AD2d 492, 29 PERB ^ 7018 (2d Dept 1996) (side letter 
was effective for the duration of collective bargaining agreement to which it 
corresponded).
18 Id.
19 Id.; see also UFT(Cruz), 48 PERB ^ 3004, at 3010.
Case Nos. U-32847 & U-33264 - 8 -
processing of grievances under the Act.”20 In particular, "an employee's mere 
disagreement with the tactics utilized or dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of 
representation does not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation.”21 Here, 
Jones does not even argue that the Union’s conclusion was an erroneous application of 
the Side Letter, he merely argues that the Side Letter could not be treated as part of the 
Agreement, a claim for which he adduces no basis. Indeed, even if Jones’s legal 
argument were correct, he "would have at most asserted ‘an honest mistake resulting 
from misunderstanding,’ insufficient to constitute a breach of the duty of fair 
representation.”22
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Jones’ charge and affirm the decision of the
ALJ.23
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
20 UFT (Gibson), 48 PERB fl 3015 (2015) (quoting CSEA (Munroe), 47 PERB fl 3031, at 
3095, citing Amalg Transit Union, Local 1056 (Lefevre), 43 PERB fl 3027, 3104 (2010).
21 Id., citing TWU, L 100 (Brockington), 37 PERB fl 3002, 3006 (2004) (quotation marks 
omitted); Civ Serv Empl Assn (Smulyan), 45 PEr B fl 3008, 3017 (2012).
22UFT (Barnes), 48 PERB fl 3017 (2015), quoting CSEA (Munroe), 47 PERB fl3031, at 
3096 (quoting Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB fl3008 at 3026; citing CSEA 
(Kandel), 13 PERB fl3049 (1980)).
23 Member Robert S. Hite took no part in the deliberations or disposition of this matter.
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Eric Scott Neithardt to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Elwood Teachers’ Alliance (ETA) 
did not violate §§ 209-a.2 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by agreeing to certain terms of employment for social workers, including Neithardt, 
employed by the Elwood Union Free School District (District).1
EXCEPTIONS
Neithardt excepts to the ALJ’s decision on the grounds that the ALJ had erred by 
finding that: (1) Neithardt had not alleged that the ETA was improperly motivated; and 
(2) the ETA did not breach its duty of fair representation noting, in particular, that an 
amendment to the collective bargaining in question was not voted on by the members of 
the ETA in violation of that organization’s by-laws, that the ETA improperly waived the 1
1 47 PERB 4601 (2014).
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rights of unit members to file a contract grievance, file charges with the Board or 
otherwise commence litigation over matters in question, and the agreement reached by 
the ETA with the District did not address Neithardt’s concerns and was reached to 
punish Neithardt for engaging in protected activity.
FACTS
On August 7, 2013, Neithardt filed an amended improper practice charge alleging 
that the ETA violated §§ 209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act by agreeing to terms of 
employment for social workers with respect to summer work that differed from the terms 
governing other members of the ETA.2 Specifically, he alleged that the ETA breached 
its duty of fair representation by entering into two agreements with the District, one 
dated June 7, 2005, and the other dated June 18, 2013.3 He takes issue with the 
agreed-upon June and summer work requirements for social workers and their rate of 
pay, as well as the June 18, 2013 agreement’s bar against ETA members grieving the 
terms of that agreement in any forum.4
The ETA denied violating the Act and asserted several affirmative defenses, 
including untimeliness.5 The ALJ held a hearing on July 9, 2014, at which time Neithardt 
and the ETA were represented, following which the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
2 Neithardt withdrew his initial charge which included claims against the District (ALJ Ex 
1). At issue is his amended complaint. ALJ Ex 2.
3 ALJ Ex 4.
4ALJ Ex 2.
5 The ALJ, while noting that Neithardt became aware of perceived disparities in terms of 
employment as early as 2007 and voiced his concerns many times thereafter, found 
that the ETA president’s ongoing efforts to seek revisions of the 2005 agreement served 
to toll the limitations period, since Neithardt reasonably could have expected that the 
agreement would be amended in response to his demands.
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The ETA moved to dismiss the charges on the basis that Neithardt failed to state a 
prima facie case. The ALJ ultimately granted the ETA’s motion after the submission of 
evidence and post-hearing briefs. In her decision, the ALJ addressed the merits of the 
charge, making findings of fact and concluding that no violation had been established. 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision, and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions before us.
Neithardt was the only witness to testify in support of his charge. He was one of 
four social workers and a member of the bargaining unit represented by the ETA along 
with other District employees (including guidance counsellors and psychologists).6 He 
testified that social workers were required to work until June 30 of each school year, as 
opposed to other unit members who were required to work only until the last day of 
classes, which occurred before June 30. Social workers, however, receive no additional 
pay for those extra work days, in contrast to other unit employees who are paid if they 
work beyond the last day of classes. In addition, the summer per diem rate of pay for 
social workers in the District is less than that for other bargaining unit members.7 
Before June 2013, social workers received seven percent of their annual ten-month 
salary, compared to 1/200th as the per diem rate. The June 2013 agreement changed 
the rate of pay to 1/260th for social workers.8 Neithardt stated that over the course of 
"several years” before May 2013, he had complained to the ETA president Lorelei
6ALJ Ex 4, at Ex A (by consent agreement dated June 7, 2005, social workers affiliated 
with the ETA rather than another unit).
7 Id.
8 ALJ Ex 3, at Ex A.
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Stephens about this alleged disparity, but the ETA did nothing.9 Also, in both spring of 
2012 and of 2013, the District superintendent had requested that social workers reduce 
the number of days they worked in the summer due to budgetary concerns, stating that 
if the June 2005 agreement, which referenced social workers working 20 days during 
the summer, was to be strictly adhered to, it could lead to one person being excessed 
and a position eliminated. Neithardt took issue with the District’s action and advocated 
with the District to notify social workers of how many days they had to work if the 
number was to be less than 20, so they could plan their time off in advance.10 1
Additionally, in June 2013, Neithardt learned that he and another social worker were the 
only two of the four social workers at the school who were required to work through 
June 30th.11
On cross-examination, Neithardt testified that in 2007 he first began to express 
his concerns about the disparity in summer pay and work to June 30. That was a year 
or two after he became a unit member.12 He also affirmed that he was paid the same as 
all other social workers, none of whom were paid 1/200th, as were other unit 
employees.13
Stephens testified that the 2005 agreement was the result of her efforts to have 
social workers included in the bargaining unit so they would get better benefits. She
9 Tr, at pp. 15-17, 57 (Neithardt testified he knew of the arrangement whereby social 
workers worked until June 30th as far back as 2007).
10 Tr, at p. 18.
11 Tr, at pp. 37-38. The undisputed record shows that one of the social workers was on 
maternity leave and the other had only been hired recently and was unaware that she 
would be required to work past the last day of classes.
12 Tr, at p. 57.
13 Tr, at p. 58.
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also stated that no part of the agreement was intended to disadvantage any or all of the 
social workers. When Neithardt and another social worker came to her with concerns 
about the disparity between social workers and other unit members, she said she 
reminded them of the circumstances and terms of the June 2005 agreement, but agreed 
that since there was a disparity she would take the matter to the superintendent. She 
said she also felt that the social workers should have advance notice of the summer 
days they were expected to work.14 She not only met with the superintendent five or 
six times, but also with other administrators, such as the assistant superintendent for 
business, to try to resolve the issues. The number of people she met with, in fact, was 
the reason for her delay in getting back to Neithardt.15 Stephens testified said that she 
felt those meetings were her responsibility as unit president.16
On May 7, 2013, Neithardt and another social worker (who was not called as a 
witness) met with Stephens and collectively voiced their concerns. Stephens told them 
she would look into the matters on their behalf and on behalf of the other ETA 
members.17 On May 28, 2013, he sent Stephens a letter repeating his concerns and 
alleging that not all social workers in the unit were being treated similarly.18
Neithardt testified that he was told by another social worker, Joanne Sapp (who 
did not testify at the hearing), that Stephens was upset about his e-mail and felt he was 
going to "ruin it for all the social workers.” Sapp allegedly advised him to "back off” for a
14 Tr, at p. 77.
15 Tr, at pp. 77-84, 96.
16 Tr, at pp. 85-88.
17 Tr, at p. 17.
18 Charging Party’s Ex 3.
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while since Stephens was very upset.19 Stephens testified that she felt that Neithardt
"didn’t understand what she was trying to do.” She did not recall saying that Neithardt’s
conduct was going to "ruin it for all social workers.”20
Stephens sent Neithardt an e-mail that addressed a number of his perceptions,
including the fact that social workers are 10-month employees rather than 11-month
employees as are others in the unit. Stephens also wrote:
The tone of your correspondence, quite frankly, was rude 
and disrespectful. I represent every member and must 
prioritize my time.... Since our meeting, I have met with 
NYSUT [and four other individuals] regarding your concerns 
and demands.... You obviously have no concept of all that I 
do. I have spent the last twelve years as president of the 
Elwood Teachers Alliance and twenty-one years prior to that 
as a member of the Executive Board in many capacities. I 
have worked tirelessly for the rights of our members. I am 
responsible for social workers being able to join the ETA and 
enjoy all of its benefits.... The social worker agreement will 
be addressed, I assure you.21
Stephens subsequently had several meetings with the District’s superintendent.22
On June 3, 2013, Stephens met with all four social workers. At that meeting 
Stephens reportedly said that because Neithardt put his concerns in writing, she had to 
share them with the superintendent. She also reported that the superintendent said that 
if the employees wanted everything to be "fair,” then all would have to work without 
compensation to June 30. One social worker reportedly said that she was not even
19 Tr, at p. 35.
20 Tr, at p. 97; Stephen also testified that her concern was that bringing up the matter 
with the District, those two social workers who had not worked through the end of June 
would have to give back hours.
21 Charging Party’s Ex 9.
22 Tr, at pp. 77-84, 96.
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aware she was expected to work until June 30, and Stephens allegedly stated that it 
was also her duty to protect the two who had been working according to different terms. 
Stephens again said she would speak with the superintendent.23
In an e-mail dated June 11, 2013, to all social workers, Stephens summarized an 
agreement she reached with the District on behalf of the ETA and with the express 
approval of the ETA’s executive board pursuant to which: consistent with the existing 
agreement, all social workers were still required to work until June 30 of each school 
year with no additional compensation; the per diem summer rate for social workers 
would be set at 1/260th; summer days of work for social workers were to be posted by 
June 1 of each year; social workers could not grieve any action related to the 
agreement or bring a PERB charge relating thereto; and one social worker would be 
allowed to work five days during the summer of 2013 to make up for the expected days 
up to June 30, since she had other plans and no prior notice of the work requirement.24
With respect to Neithardt’s claim that two social workers (Sapp and Mitchell) 
were not required to work up to June 30 in 2013, Stephens said that they did not work 
beyond the last day of school that year because Sapp was on maternity leave and 
Mitchell was unaware of the requirement because she was a new employee and had 
not been advised of it when she was hired. Mitchell, however, did work five days during 
the summer to make up the days she did not work in June. Stephens testified that she 
made it clear that the two that did not work until June 30 would have to give back hours
23 Tr, at p. 98.
24 Charging Party’s Ex 4.
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to the District.25
Stephens said that every year she tried to get the social workers paid at the 
1/200th rate applicable to others in the unit, but was told by the superintendent that they 
had an agreement and he would not change it.26 When she met with the 
superintendent in June 2013, she was focused on preserving jobs while achieving the 
best terms she could for unit members. While the rate of compensation did change, it 
was not to the level Neithardt wanted though Stephens said she raised the issue and 
pushed for parity among all unit members. She affirmed that she conveyed all of 
Neithardt’s concerns, as well as those of other social workers in the unit, and the June 
2013 agreement was the result of those discussions. Stephens testified that she 
believed the 2013 agreement was in the best interests of the unit overall and affirmed 
that her duty must be to the unit as a whole.27
Neithardt testified that all social workers have been and continue to be paid at 
the same rate; his salary was not singled out for reduction.28
DISCUSSION
Before us are exceptions to an ALJ’s determination dismissing Neithardt’s claim 
that the ETA breached its duty of fair presentation for failure to state a prima facie case. 
In considering the ETA’s motion to dismiss, the ALJ correctly assumed the truth of the 
evidence before her and gave every favorable inference to that proof.29 Moreover, the
25Tr, at pp. 84-90, 98.
26Tr, at p. 90.
27Tr, at pp. 94-96, 107-109.
28 Tr, at p. 58.
29 County of Nassau, 17 PERB 3013 (1984).
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ALJ also considered the complete record as developed in a full evidentiary hearing and 
also made findings based on the record as if she did not grant the motion to dismiss.
Before examining Neithardt’s overarching exception to the ALJ’s determination, 
we can briefly address two distinct matters he has raised. First, citing the ETA’s 
constitution and by-laws, Neithardt alleges that the failure of the ETA to have a formal 
membership vote on the agreement reached by Stephens constitutes a breach of its 
duty of fair representation. However, the Board has long held that actions by a union 
relating to its internal affairs and management are beyond our jurisdiction. Thus, even if 
such concerns were valid and supported by evidence, which they are not, we will not 
address them in this context.30
Second, Neithardt alleges that the ETA, in "bad faith and direct retaliation” for his 
letter of May 28, 2013, agreed with the District that any dispute arising out of the 
agreement reached in June, 2013 would "be finally determined by the Superintendent,
30 UFT (Leon), 48 PERB fl 3016 (2015) (citing TWU, L 100 (Asamoah), 47 PERB fl 
3033, 3101-3102 (2014)); see generally CSEA (Bogack), 9 PERB fl 3064 (1976); Cove 
Neck Police Benevolent Assn (Belardo), 24 Pe Rb fl 3028 (1991); Westchester County 
Dept of Correction Superior Officers' Ass'n, Inc. (Cummaro, et al), 26 PERB fl 3077 
(1993); as well as Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of Syracuse and 
Syracuse Teachers Assn, Inc. (Willey), 7 PERB fl 4539 (1974) where the hearing officer 
analyzed the Act and its legislative history and concluded:
Viewed against this background, the Taylor Law was clearly 
designed by the Governor's Committee and the Legislature 
to protect only employee rights---to organize and to be 
represented in the determination of their employment 
conditions—and was not meant to control or regulate the 
internal relationship between organizations and their 
members. (footnote omitted).
See Tr, at pp. 92-93 wherein Stephens testified that she was unanimously authorized by 
the ETA’s executive board to enter into the agreement. Whether this was all that is 
needed under the terms of the ETA’s by-laws to effectuate such change in mid-term in a 
collective bargaining agreement is not for us to determine.
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whose determination shall not be reviewable in any forum, including but not limited to 
the filing of a grievance, in arbitration, PERB proceeding, or litigation in any judicial or 
quasi-judicial tribunal.” There is not a scintilla of evidence or proffer of fact of any 
connection between this portion of the agreement and Neithardt’s actions, only 
conclusory language that this part of the agreement, which was reached mid-term of an 
existing collective bargaining addressing a discrete concern of four members of the 
bargaining unit, "must” have been agreed to in retaliation for his advocacy efforts. Such 
conclusory allegations are insufficient to plead, let alone prove, a violation of the duty of 
fair representation.31 Without addressing whether such an agreement is proper, as in 
the course of collective negotiations the parties may agree to waive a number of items, 
we note that contrary to Neithardt’s exceptions, this clause did not take "away . . . even 
the right to file this PERB proceeding.” He is not harmed by this particular clause. He 
has brought a claim and it has not been challenged under that portion of that 
agreement. As noted below, there is a complete absence of facts supporting his claim 
of a violation of the duty of fair representation. In such a context, the ALJ properly did 
not grant relief based on this claim.
Returning to the crux of his exceptions, the Board has long held that to establish 
a breach of the duty of fair representation under the Act, a charging party "has the 
burden of proof to demonstrate that an employee organization's conduct or actions are
31 UFT (Leon), 48 PERB fl 3018, at n. 19 (quoting UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB fl 
3031, 3095 (2014)); confd sub nom Munroe v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 48 PERB fl 
7002 (Sup Ct NY Co 2015) (citing PEF (Goonewardena), 27 PERB fl 3006 (1994)); see 
also UFT (Arredondo), 48 PERB fl 3010, 3034 (2015) (same).
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arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.”32 As we recently noted, the courts 
have:
reject[ed] the standard . . . that "irresponsible or grossly 
negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union's breach 
of the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of 
improper employee organization practices set forth in Civil 
Service Law § 209-a. An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union.33
Mere disagreement with a union’s tactics or dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of 
representation does not violate the Act nor will negligence alone establish a breach of a 
union’s statutory duty.34 In the record before the ALJ which is now before the Board, 
there is simply no evidence of bias, bad faith or discrimination.
Neithardt takes exception to the ALJ’s finding that "no allegation is made by 
Neithardt that the ETA was improperly motivated.”35 He recites Ms. Stephens’ 
professed anger at his stating concerns over working conditions for social workers and
32 CSEA (Munroe), 47 PERB fl 3031, at 3095; CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB fl 3027, 3082­
3083 (2014), (quoting District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB fl 
3027, 3119 (2008)).
33 CSEA (Munroe), 47 PERB fl 3031 at 3095; Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB fl 
3008, 3026 (2014) (quoting CSEA, Local 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz),
132 AD2d 430, 432, 20 PERB fl 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 
NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl 7017 (1988)). We do not find Neithardt’s citations to cases 
decided under the National Labor Relations Act to be persuasive. We note that, under
§ 209-a.6 of the Act, "fundamental distinctions between private and public employment 
shall be recognized, and no body of federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to 
private employment, shall be regarded as binding or controlling precedent.” Here, the 
issues raised by Neithardt’s exceptions are governed under our own well-settled 
precedent, and recourse to outside cases is unilluminating and unavailing.
34 TWU, Local 100 (Brockington), 37 PERB fl 3002, 3006 (2004) (quotation marks 
omitted); CSEA (Smulyan), 45 PERB fl 3008, 3017 (2012).
35 Exceptions, at p. 10.
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draws a conclusion that what was negotiated and agreed to by the ETA and the District 
was improperly motivated.
However, the ALJ did consider these allegations, and expressly found that 
"[e]ven taking as true Neithardt’s claim that it was reported to him that Stephens was 
upset about his letter to her, that alone does not establish improper practice or bad 
faith.”36 The ALJ found that a union leader’s possible anger with Neithardt’s behavior, 
in the context of no evidence of any arbitrary action, that is to say an action so far 
outside a wide range of reasonableness that it is wholly irrational, does not establish a 
prima facie case of a breach of the duty of fair representation. Indeed, this is the only 
fact proffered by Neithardt to establish animus.
The agreement reached by the ETA with the District, although not satisfactory to 
Neithardt, addressed the perceived unfairness to two social workers who would 
otherwise have been impacted by continuing the school year through June 30. The 
accommodation seems reasonable, not arbitrary, and the record is void of any malice 
towards Neithardt.
The ALJ also found that, even if Stephens were mistaken in her judgment, such 
action falls short of the conduct necessary to establish a claim against the ETA. Indeed, 
the ETA treated other similarly situated unit members the same and improved their 
terms of employment. Neithardt may have thought that treating social workers 
differently than other members of the unit was unfair but in the absence of any animus 
or arbitrariness on the part of the ETA, such results are not actionable.
36 47 PERB 4601, at 4895, at n. 19.
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In essence, Neithardt objects to the District treating social workers differently 
than other members of the ETA and the ETA’s handling of those concerns. It is 
hornbook law, as we have held in the past, that an employee organization has broad 
discretion in balancing the interests of all unit employees in formulating negotiating 
proposals and agreeing to terms and conditions of employment.37 A union's 
compromise of employees’ potential contractual benefits does not violate its duty of fair 
representation.38 Absent evidence of bad faith or improper motivation, a union’s 
discretion governs.39 In this matter, the facts indicate that the union acted on behalf of 
its members as evidenced by the uncontroverted testimony of its president and her 
history of advocacy on behalf of ETA’s members.
We have also long held that “[credibility determinations by an ALJ are generally 
entitled to ‘great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record compelling a 
conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.’”40 In the instant case, no 
such objective evidence demonstrating that the ALJ's credibility determinations are 
manifestly incorrect has been adduced, and we therefore will not reverse them.
Thus, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the ALJ’s determination in full.
37 Civ Serv Bar Assn, L 237 v City of New York, 64 NY2d 188, 196-197 (1984).
38 County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff and Teamsters Local 264, 27 Pe RB fl 3081 
(1994).
39 State of New York (Robinson), 14 PERB fl 3043 (1981); Plainview-Old Bethpage 
Cent Sch Dist, 7 PERB fl 3058, 3097 (1974); ATU, Local 1342 (Lynch), 22 PERB fl 
3058 (1989); UFT, Local 2 (Kauder), 18 PERB fl 3048 (1985).
40 Village of Endicott, 47 PERB fl 3017, 3051 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free 
Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3005, at 3019 (2008), citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB fl 3016, at 
3062 (2011); Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl 3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 
23 PERB fl 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB fl 3054 (1979); Captain's 
Endowment Assn, 10 PERB fl 3034 (1977)).
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the ALJ’s findings are affirmed and the
charge is hereby dismissed.
DATED: November 10, 2015
Albany, New York
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Cortland and the 
Cortland County Sheriff (together, County) and on cross-exceptions filed by the County 
Police Association of Cortland, Inc. (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ).1 The ALJ found that the County violated § 209-a (1) (d) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally requiring employees represented 
by the Association to participate in an audit of the continued eligibility of insured 
dependents by providing specified documents to the County. Prior to the issuance of 
the ALJ’s decision, Supreme Court, Albany County issued an order temporarily 
restraining the County from requiring members of the bargaining unit to comply with the
1 47 PERB H 4592 (2014).
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requirements of the audit.2 Subsequently, the parties stipulated that the County would 
not enforce compliance until the Board issued a decision in this matter.
EXCEPTIONS
The County excepts to the ALJ’s decision on five grounds.3 First, the County 
contends that the ALJ erred in her "implied findings of fact that the County was requiring 
full-non-redacted documentation.”4 The County claims that the ALJ erred in finding that 
the County did not communicate to the affected employees the scope of permissible 
redaction of the documents, and thus wrongly concluded that significantly more 
information was being demanded than had been previously provided to the County.
The County asserts as its second exception that the ALJ erroneously concluded 
that the imposition of a new work rule that requires an employee to participate in the 
employer’s investigation was perforce a mandatory subject of bargaining. Instead, the 
County argues, the ALJ should have balanced the parties’ interests, finding the subject 
non-mandatory because participating in the audit had only a slight impact on the 
employees and had a major impact on essential management functions.
In its third exception, the County contends that the ALJ erred by finding 
participation in the audit to be mandatorily bargainable, even if it constituted a change to 
terms and conditions of employment, because it did not constitute a substantial change. 
According to the County, only a substantial change to terms and conditions of 
employment is mandatorily bargainable, and thus participation in the audit does not 
suffice to establish a violation of the Act.
2 ALJ Ex 5.
3 The sixth exception re-asserts the bases of the preceding five to except to the finding 
of a violation.
4 Exceptions, at pp.1-2.
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The County’s fourth exception is that the ALJ’s "implied refusal to consider the 
County’s Health Insurance Plan document which gave the County the right to request 
the information as part of the verification process”5 constituted reversible error. The 
County contends that the document provides the County with the authority and the 
obligation to ensure that only legitimately covered dependents are provided coverage.
As its fifth exception, the County claims that public policy mandates a finding that 
participation in the audit is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. Citing the 
"prevalence of fraud throughout the health care industry”6 and the "public policy” of 
cases such as Riggs v. Palmer that "no one shall be permitted to profit from his own 
fraud,” 7 the County argues that prophylactic measures to prevent such fraud and 
abuse should preempt negotiations here.
The Association filed cross-exceptions, in which it asserted that the ALJ did not 
reach its third argument, that the forced disclosure of personal information constituted a 
sufficient basis for finding a violation of the Act. In the event, the Board determined that 
the ALJ erred in finding a violation, the Association requests the Board to reach this 
contention. The Association takes further exception to the ALJ’s remedial order to the 
extent that it did not order documents submitted by unit employees destroyed pursuant 
to the audit whether they are in the possession of the County or of its agent, BMI Audit 
Services, LLC, as well as any documents developed from such submitted documents.
FACTS
The Association represents a unit of approximately 31 employees of the County 
and the Sheriff in the titles of County Police Officer (Deputy Sheriff), County Police
5 Exceptions, at p. 6.
6 Exceptions, at p. 9.
7 115 NY 506, 511-512 (1889).
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Sergeant (Deputy Sheriff), County Police Lieutenant (Deputy Sheriff) and County Police 
Captain (Deputy Sheriff).8 Members of the bargaining unit and their eligible dependents 
receive health insurance coverage through and under the terms of the County Health 
Plan. The County, self-insured since 2004, uses a third party administrator, EBS- 
RMSCO, to administer its health plan.
The County has unilaterally promulgated a booklet, entitled the Cortland County 
Health Plan (Plan), which "is the Plan Document for the Cortland County Health Care 
Plan and is also intended to operate as your Summary Plan Description.”9 The Plan 
defines a "dependent” as "your Child or legal spouse from whom you are not legally 
divorced or whose marriage has not been legally annulled.”10 1A "child” is defined as 
"your biological Child, stepchild, legally adopted Child or Child for whom you or your 
spouse are the legal guardian until they turn age 26.”11
The Plan provides:
If a spouse loses coverage due to a divorce, legal annulment, or if a 
Child loses coverage because the Child no longer qualifies as a 
Dependent, the Employee, spouse or Dependent must notify the 
Plan Administrator within 60 days of the Change in Status if they 
wish to continue coverage....Failure to notify the Plan Administrator 
within 60 days of the Change in Status will result in the Covered 
Family Member losing all rights to continue coverage under this 
Plan.12
The Plan further defines the discretion of the Plan Administrator, as 
encompassing "the absolute authority and discretion to construe any uncertain or
8 ALJ Ex 1; Tr, at p. 23.
9 Respondent’s Ex 1, at p. 1.
10 Id., at p.13.
11 Id., at p. 11. This definition also provides for coverage beyond age 26 for a child who 
is "mentally or physically handicapped, mentally ill, or developmentally disabled, as 
determined by the Social Security Administration, and incapable of self-sustaining 
employment..” Id.
12 Id., at p. 29.
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disputed term or provision of the Plan.”13 Such discretion includes “[determining 
whether an individual is [ejligible for benefits under this Plan.”14 The County 
Administrator, the designated Plan Administrator, has delegated the duties of that 
position to Annette Barber, the County Personnel Officer.
To obtain coverage under the Plan, an employee must fill out an enrollment form, 
various versions of which have consistently required the name, date of birth, gender, 
and social security number of any spouse or dependent, and a representation that the 
information provided was, to the best of the employee’s knowledge, true, correct or 
accurate.15 Some versions of the enrollment form have required information concerning 
a spouse’s employment and health coverage provided through that employment. No 
version of the enrollment form has required documentary verification of dependent 
eligibility.
In July 2014, the County’s Personnel/Civil Service Department sent unit 
employees a notice stating that the County had contracted with BMI Associates to audit 
the dependent enrollment in the County’s Health Plan, and instructing them to 
cooperate with BMI’s requests pursuant to the audit.16 According to Barber, the County 
decided to perform the audit after its consultant pointed out that the use of such audits 
“seems to be a trend as people try to make sure there [are] no fraudulent dependents 
on the plan,” and the County Administrator attended a workshop at which the problem of
13 Respondent’s Ex 1, at p. 65.
14 Id. The Plan provides that the exercise of this discretion is “binding upon all 
interested parties, including, but not limited to, the Covered Family Member, the 
Covered Family Member’s estate, any beneficiary of the Covered Family Member and 
the County,” subject to review under an arbitrary and capricious or bad faith standard.
15 Tr, at pp. 68-78; Respondent’s Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
16 Charging Party’s Ex 1; Tr, at p.19.
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ineligible dependents receiving benefits was discussed.17
Subsequently, BMI mailed a three-page letter dated July 21,2014 to all County 
employees enrolled in the health plan, which expressly stated that "[t]he audit review of 
your enrolled dependents is not optional.”18 The letter reiterated the Plan’s definition of 
eligible dependents, and required employees to identify and submit documentation to 
verify the continuing eligibility of dependents. Under the title "Helpful Information,” the 
July 21 letter provides a list of the documents that can be used to verify eligibility. Thus, 
to verify a spouse’s continued eligibility, employees were directed to file a valid marriage 
certificate or marriage license, and either a redacted Federal tax form 1040 or a "joint 
document dated within the last 6 months.”19 Examples of "joint documents” provided 
were a mortgage statement, bank statement, utility bill, rental/lease agreement, property 
tax statement, auto insurance statement or homeowners’ insurance.20 Similar 
verification requirements were provided for a legally separated spouse, a natural or 
adopted child, an eligible stepchild, or to establish legal guardianship.
The July 21,2014 letter includes a sample of the dependent verification form 
employees were to complete and submit. The form requires the employee to "certify 
that the information I am providing is true and complete. I understand that if I knowingly 
submit false and/or misleading information or documentation my employer may take 
appropriate disciplinary action.”21 Below the certification, the form provides: "FAILURE 
TO COMPLETE THIS AUDIT MAY RESULT IN CANCELLATION OF BENEFITS FOR
17 Tr, at pp. 90-91.
18 Charging Party’s Ex 2, at p. 1.
19 Id., at p. 2.
20 Id., at p. 2.
21 Id., at p. 3.
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AN UNVERIFIED DEPENDENT.”22
The form also provides for redactions, stating: "PLEASE REMOVE/ BLACKOUT/
REDACT/ ALL SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION ON
ANY DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED.”23 With respect to redactions, the ALJ, after quoting
the July 21,2014 letter, summarized the testimony before her:
The County’s main witness, Annette Barber, testified that 
employees were permitted to redact information irrelevant to 
determining the eligibility of a spouse or dependent. For example, 
if a federal form 1040 was being submitted to verify the eligibility of 
a spouse, everything on the form other than the spouse’s name, 
social security number, filing status and dependent exemption box 
could be redacted.24 Barber also acknowledged that none of the 
written communications with County employees stated this, and 
that employees would not know this unless they called to ask 
questions about redacting.25
At the hearing, Barber agreed that the form portion of the July 21,2014 letter 
does not "say that any information can be redacted other than financial information” or 
Social Security numbers."26
The July 21 2014 letter mandates employees who do not have copies of the 
required documents obtain them as soon as possible and advises that the cost of 
obtaining copies will not be defrayed by the County or BMI.
Finally, the July 21,2014 letter provides for an amnesty period:
It is important that you review the eligibility rules within your plan 
document to confirm that your covered dependents are eligible for 
coverage. Cortland County is allowing an amnesty period during 
which employees/retirees will have the opportunity to voluntarily 
identify any ineligible dependents and therefore avoid any 
penalties, legal action and/or discipline, provided that the ineligible 
dependent(s) does not incur any claims on or after 8/15/2014 and is
22 Charging Party’s Ex 2, at p. 3.
23 Id. (emphasis in original).
24 Tr, at pp. 47-48.
25 47 PERB at ^4592, at 4583-4584.
26 Tr, at pp. 104-105.
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voluntarily removed by 9/19/2014.
Barber, who had ultimate responsibility for verifying the eligibility of dependents, 
testified that no similar comprehensive audit had been previously undertaken. She 
further testified that the County had intermittently required employees to provide 
documentation of changes in eligibility status, and gave at least two examples involving 
members of the Association. However, Barber did not review every health insurance 
file for every member of the bargaining unit represented by the Association. She did 
admit that, since 2004, the County had not required that a birth or marriage certificate 
be provided in order to add a dependent to the plan. Barber also acknowledged that the 
County had occasionally asked for the employment status of a spouse, or for the name 
and contact information of a spouse’s employer. Barber’s testimony on this point was 
consistent with that of Laurie Gosse, the County’s Deputy Personnel Officer, who 
handled the day-to-day administration of the County Health Plan. The ALJ found, and 
no party has disputed, that "[t]he record is silent as to any contractual basis for the 
health benefits provided.”27
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the County’s first exception does not provide a basis upon 
which we could reverse the ALJ’s determination, as the purported "implied factual 
finding” asserted plays no part in the ALJ’s rationale for finding a violation. The ALJ did
27 47 PERB 4592, at 4852. In its brief in support of its exceptions, the County asserts 
that, subsequent to the close of the record, it has "found that there were ten ineligible 
dependents on the County health insurance plan for members from units other than the 
Association in this matter,” and that one of those ineligible dependents had been 
divorced from the employee for over seventeen years.” Id. at 22, n. 4. We do not 
question the veracity of counsel’s representation, but such a representation does not 
constitute evidence, and, in any event, § 213.2 of our Rules of Procedure "limits our 
review of the ALJ’s decision to the record before him or her.” CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB 
3027, 3082 (2014).
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not predicate her ruling in any way on the adequacy or inadequacy of the notification to 
employees by BMI or the County of their right to redact information not required to 
establish the eligibility of dependents. As neither the ALJ’s analysis of the audit’s 
negotiability nor our own is in any way impacted by the accuracy of the ALJ’s factual 
finding on the issue of redactions, we decline to address this exception.28
It is long been settled that the provision of health insurance to employees and 
their dependents is a mandatorily negotiable term and condition of employment.29 The 
procedures by which benefits are altered or terminated are themselves mandatorily 
negotiable.30
Against this backdrop, we examine the County’s decision to implement the 
dependent eligibility audit at issue here. We begin by acknowledging that the 
prevention of fraud or even waste by the continued payment of benefits to ineligible 
persons as dependents is an entirely legitimate concern of the County. Indeed, we 
acknowledge that the decision to undertake such an audit does not in and of itself 
constitute a mandatory subject. We dare say that had the County approached the 
Association with its plan for an audit, issues of concern that appear to have caused this 
charge to be filed by the Association, would possibly have surfaced and satisfactorily
28 See, e.g., Centro, Inc. CNY, 17 PERB fl 3035, 3058 (1984); State of New York (State 
University of New York at Buffalo), 46 PERB fl 3021, 3037 (2013).
29See, e.g., Aeneas McDonald Police Benev Assn v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326, 331­
332 (1998) ("Health benefits for current employees can be a form of compensation, and 
thus a term of employment that is a mandatory subject of negotiation”) (citing Board 
cases); Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 AD3d 1479,
1481,45 PERB fl 7006, 7023 (3d Dept 2012), affd, 21 NY3d 255, 266, 46 PERB fl 
7008, 7021 (2013) (same); Town of Haverstraw v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 75 AD2d 
874, 13 PERB fl 7006 (2d Dept 1980), confd 12 PERB fl 3064 (1979); see also Lippman 
v Bd of Education, Sewanhaka Sch Dist, 104 AD2d 123, 18 PERB fl 7503, 7514-7515 
(3d Dept 1984).
30 See, e.g., County of Chemung, 44 PERB fl 3026, 3095 (2011); City of Watertown v 
NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB fl 7007 (2000).
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addressed through negotiations before the commencement of the audit itself
However, the legitimate business reasons for the audit—here, the County’s
legitimate managerial obligation to account for use of public funds and to ensure against
fraud and waste —do not negate negotiability under the Act of the procedures requiring
employee participation in the audit to the extent that they involve or affect mandatory
terms and conditions of employment. The Plan, which the County unilaterally
promulgated and which the Association did not challenge, may reasonably be read to
support an audit, but not to compel the employee participation at issue here.
As we explained in New York City Transit Authority:
An employer’s reservation of rights to act unilaterally with respect to 
a term and condition of employment constitutes a mandatory 
subject. When an employer acts consistent with an unchallenged 
policy explicitly reserving for itself the unfettered discretion to 
determine whether to continue a specific term and condition of 
employment, the employer’s decision to act pursuant to the 
reservation of right is not considered to be unilateral under the Act.
Unlike contract reversion to a specifically negotiated provision, 
however, a reservation of right in an employer’s policy does not 
stem from the employer satisfying its duty to negotiate under the 
Act. Therefore, the Board must strictly construe a policy-based 
reservation of right in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.31
The Plan grants the Administrator broad discretion, including, but not limited to, 
“[determining whether an individual is [ejligible for benefits under this Plan.” In view of 
the breadth of the delegation, we believe that this policy may reasonably be read to 
encompass the County auditing the eligibility of those receiving benefits. However, 
strictly construed as it must be under our decision in NYC Transit Authority, the Plan 
cannot be read to encompass the participation of all employees enrolled in family 
coverage in a broad, prophylactic audit to the extent that they involve or affect
31 42 PERB H 3012, 3039 (2009), confd sub nom NYC Transit Auth v NYS Public Empl 
Relations Bd, 78 AD3d 1184 (2d Dept 2010), affd, 19 NY3d 876 (2012).
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mandatory terms and conditions of employment. Such a broad reading of the Plan 
would not, as we see it, effectuate the policies of the Act, but would, rather, allow for the 
extrapolation of corollary rights from an explicit reservation of right that is broader than 
permissible under the Act.32
In City of Schenectady, the Board explained that a unilateral change to the 
employees’ obligations to verify their compliance with the residency requirement 
violated the Act:
While certain changes in the method of recordkeeping may not rise 
to the level of a change in terms and conditions of employment, 
substantial changes in the type or amount of information recorded 
affect terms and conditions of employment and therefore must be 
bargained. Here, the employees have in the past been required to 
keep the City apprised of any changes in address, and have filed a 
form to do so. The City’s argument that its right to impose the 
residency requirement carries with it the implicit right to employee 
participation in the compliance-tracking process need not, 
therefore, be decided. It already has a practice of employee 
participation in the recordkeeping process. The relevant inquiry is 
whether the at-issue form reflects merely, as the City asserts in its 
brief, a "mechanical,” and not a qualitative, change in unit 
employees’ participation. It does not. The at-issue form is 
substantially different from the one previously filed, including a 
monetary component, as the employee may have to pay a notary 
fee in order to get the required notarization, and the required 
provision of a voter registration card, which alone raises a 
significant privacy issue.33
Similarly, in City of Syracuse, the Board found that the unilateral enforcement of 
the City’s residency requirement through a "residency monitoring program, which 
mandated each employee to prepare, sign and submit, on a regular basis, a certification 
form attesting to his or her residence,” with supporting documentation where the City 
deemed it necessary, violated the Act.34 Relying on Schenectady, the Board found that
32 Id., at 3039.
33 26 PERB fl 3025, 3042 (1993).
34 44 PERB fl 3017, 3065-3066 (2011).
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the requisite provision of documents, potential payment of a notary fee, prospect of 
punishment for perjury, and loss of privacy in the documents required “constitute^] a 
substantial change in the form and substance of recordkeeping delegated by the City to 
unit members.”35
In Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York v Public 
Employment Relations Board, the Court of Appeals upheld our finding that financial 
disclosure procedures were a mandatory subject of bargaining, reasoning “that 
monitoring corruption is sufficiently attenuated from the primary educational mission or 
function of the school district that it may be outweighed by the other interests involved,” 
including “strong and sweeping policy of the State” in favor of collective bargaining.36 
Here, as in that case, we “recognize that the [County] (like all public employers) ha[s] a 
significant interest in the integrity of its workforce,” but “give even greater weight to the 
employees’ interest in being able to negotiate the requirements proposed” by the 
County, which impact the innocent as well as the guilty, impose a new condition on 
receiving benefits, and impose cost and additional work on employees.37 Similarly, 
procedures by which disabled police officers may challenge the employer’s 
determination that the officer is medically able to return to duty are mandatory subjects, 
even though the employer’s right to make that initial determination is expressly provided 
for by statute.38 In sum, “while a desire to save money or increase managerial
35 Id., at 3066.
36 75 NY2d 660, 669 (1990), 23 PERB ^ 7012, 7013 (1990).
37 75 NY2d at 670-671. See also NYC Transit Auth v Pub Empl Relations Bd, 19 NY3d 
876, 45 PERB ^ 7507 (2012) (unilateral imposition of more stringent rules as to dual 
employment of safety-sensitive employees violated Act); City of New York v Bd of 
Collective Bargaining of City of New York, 107 AD3d 612, 613, 46 PERB ^ 7503 (1st 
Dept 2013) (unilateral changes to sick leave policy were not rendered non-mandatory 
because they were designed to ensure fitness for duty of crew).
38 City of Watertown v NYS Public Employment Relations Bd, 95 NY2d 73 (2000).
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efficiency are legitimate business motives[,] [s]uch motives . . . . are not relevant to the 
issue of negotiability.”39
The unilateral imposition of a new condition or conditions upon receipt of a 
benefit violates the Act.40 In the instant case, failure to comply with the requirements of 
the audit by an employee would potentially result in the termination of benefits for 
eligible dependents. Moreover, the audit contemplates that employees who do not have 
all responsive documents must obtain new copies on their own time and at their own 
expense, which the July 21,2012 letter expressly states will not be reimbursed by the 
County or BMI.
The County’s contention that we should nevertheless determine the negotiability 
of the health insurance audit on an ad hoc basis based on the weighing of the parties’ 
interest here finds no support in our cases. We have long rejected the notion that 
negotiability of a subject under the Act "turns on a balance of employer-employee 
interests on the facts of each particular case.” 41 Such a "facts-of-the-case approach to 
negotiability assessments would thus produce results which are destructive of the 
uniformity necessary for any reasoned conduct of collective negotiations by the parties 
to a bargaining relationship or to the administration of a collective bargaining statute.”42
The County has also raised public policy as weighing against negotiability here,
39 City of Poughkeepsie v Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 PERB ^ 7021,7030 (3d Dept 
1983;, lv denied, 62 NY2d 608, 17 PERB ^ 7009 (1984); NYS Thruway Authority, 47 
PEr B ^ 3032, 3099 (2014) (citing and quoting Poughkeepsie).
40 See, e.g., Schenectady Police Benevolent Assn v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 85 
NY2d 480, 28 PERB ^ 7005 (1995); Village of Monroe, 40 PERB ^ 3013, 3052 
(2007); Town of Cortland, 30 PERB ^ 3031 (1997); City of Mount Vernon, 18 PERB ^ 
3050 (1985).
41 State of New York (Department of Transportation) 27 PERB ^ 3056, 3131 (1994).
42 Id.
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citing Riggs v. Palmer43 and its progeny. We agree with the County that "[t]he principle 
that a wrongdoer may not profit from his or her wrongdoing is deeply rooted in this 
State's common law.”43 4 However, as the Court of Appeals has made clear, Riggs does 
not invalidate statutory rights of parties whose affirmative claims or defenses do not 
arise directly from the transactions tainted by their illegal actions, but simply require the 
trier of fact and law "to apply the statute to the facts presented.”45
Because the dependent eligibility verification audit extends to all employees with 
covered dependents, encompassing the innocent as well as those guilty of fraud or 
negligence, and because determining negotiability merely requires us to apply the 
statutory language of the Act to the facts applicable to all employees, we find that this is 
not a case where Riggs applies. Rather, the public policy claim advanced by the 
County, in essence, is similar to that described by the Court of Appeals in Board of 
Education: an "open-ended ‘public policy’ argument [that] is more aptly denominated a 
‘public interest’ argument, for it is not based on statute, Constitution or even clear 
common-law principles—sources in which a public policy prohibition against a collective 
bargaining agreement might be found.” 46 As the Court of Appeals found in that case, 
so too here we recognize "that reasonable people might well disagree about what
43 115 NY 506, 511-512 (1889).
44 Matter of Edwards, 121 AD3d 336, 339 (2d Dept 2014) (citing, inter alia, Riggs).
45New York Hosp Medical Center of Queens v Microtech Contracting Corp, 22 NY3d 
501,509 (2014) (holding that an employer's statutory rights under the Workers' 
Compensation Law are not extinguished merely because its injured employee is an 
undocumented alien; construing Riggs to not apply as "we are not being called upon to 
enforce or recognize rights arising from an illegal oral employment contract . . . and 
[defendant] Microtech is not raising any such employment contract as a defense to 
common-law contribution or indemnification”). The Court in New York Hospital applied 
its earlier decision in Balbuena v IDR Realty LLC, 6 NY3d 338, 363 (2006), holding "that 
an injured employee's status as an undocumented alien does not preclude recovery of 
lost wages in a personal injury action against a landowner under the State’s Labor Law.” 
22 NY3d 501, at 509.
46 75 NY2d at 669.
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measures were appropriate to further the goal of eliminating corruption. We cannot 
discern a public policy that requires that employees, prospectively, be denied any voice 
in the matter.”47
In Board of Education, the Court upheld our finding that requiring employees to 
participate in financial disclosure was a mandatory subject of bargaining. We 
accordingly reaffirm that the balance we struck in Board of Education, as affirmed by the 
Court, is and remains that applicable to the negotiability of procedures requiring 
employees to provide information in prophylactic investigations of possible financial 
abuse by employees.48
We cannot adopt the County’s argument that the occasional request for 
verification of an insured’s representation as to change of status of a newly eligible or 
ineligible dependent brings the audit within the ambit of past practice. Even if the 
evidence established a consistent past practice of verification upon a qualifying event, 
the most that has been alleged, the audit goes well beyond that, requiring all employees 
with dependents to verify the continued eligibility of their dependents absent any 
particularized reason to believe their status has changed.49
Finally, we reject the County’s argument that the change is insufficiently
47 75 NY2d at 669.
48 Id. See also New York City Trans Auth v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 19 
NY3d 876 (2012); City of New York v Bd of Collective Bargaining of City of New York, 
107 AD3d 612, 613 (1st Dept 2013).
49 We reject, for similar reasons, the County’s arguments that the employees’ initial 
provision of information regarding dependents and that the Plan gives the County the 
right to request the information as part of the verification process. While the Plan may 
reasonably be read to permit the County to verify the eligibility of covered dependents, 
the County has not identified any language in the Plan imposing a duty on covered 
employees to participate in that verification process. Against this backdrop, we cannot 
find in the Plan a basis for finding either a waiver or a satisfaction of the right to 
negotiate over verification procedures. See Orchard Park Cent Sch Dist, 47 PERB ^ 
3029, 3090 (2014).
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“substantial” to constitute an improper practice. To begin with, the Board has long held 
that, in determining whether a change is properly deemed de minimis, the value of 
the benefit at issue is not judged by the Board; the only issue is whether it affects terms 
and conditions of employment.50 Here, the imposition of a new condition on 
contractually-mandated benefits clearly affects terms and conditions of employment. 
Moreover, even viewed apart from the potential loss of benefits for non-compliance, our 
decisions in Syracuse and Schenectady preclude a finding that the change here is de 
minimis. Accordingly, we find here the requirement that the employees participate in 
the employer’s audit sufficiently implicates terms and conditions of employment such 
that the change cannot be deemed de minimis.51 Indeed, the penalty of loss of benefits 
for non-compliance are wholly inconsistent with such a finding, as we have already 
explained.
The Association’s cross-exceptions may be briefly addressed. As the ALJ’s 
finding of a violation has been affirmed, we need not address the first cross-exception, 
which was pleaded as an alternate basis for affirmance of the decision below if we did 
not affirm the ALJ’s findings in favor of the Association. The Association’s second 
cross-exception, seeking a modification of the remedy, is well taken. However, we do 
not have before us a sufficient record to determine the need for or the propriety of, let 
alone fashion, a comprehensive remedy.
Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed as to the finding of a violation, 
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
50 See County of Nassau, 32 PERB 3034 (1999) (provision of bottled water is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining); County of Nassau, 25 PERB 4555 (1992).
51 See City of Syracuse, 44 PERB 3017, at 3065-3066; City of Schenectady, 26 PERB 
3025, at 3041, citing, inter alia, Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist, 20 p Er B 3053
(1987); Spencerport Cent School Dist, 16 PERB 3074 (1983).
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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The County will forthwith cease and desist from implementing its directive 
to employees to provide documentation to support the continued eligibility of 
spouses and dependents for coverage under the County Health Plan;
2. The County will forthwith sign and post the attached notice at all physical 
and electronic locations used to post communications for bargaining unit 
employees; and
3. The matter is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings to develop the
record and determine any other appropriate remedy, including, if appropriate,
make whole relief.
DATED: November 10, 2015 
Albany, New York
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Cortland and Cortland County Sheriff in 
the unit represented by the County Police Association of Cortland, Inc., that the County 
of Cortland and Cortland County Sheriff will forthwith:
cease and desist from implementation of its directive to employees to provide 
documentation to support the continued eligibility of spouses and dependents for coverage 
under the County Health Plan and cease and desist from implementation of the directive.
D ated...........................  B y ....................................................................................
on behalf of the County of Cortland and 
Cortland County Sheriff
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material.
